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Preamble
This book written by A. Schumann& F. Smarandache is devoted to advances
of non-Archimedean multiple-validity idea and its applications to logical reason-
ing. Leibnitz was the first who proposed Archimedes’ axiom to be rejected.
He postulated infinitesimals (infinitely small numbers) of the unit interval [0, 1]
which are larger than zero, but smaller than each positive real number. Robin-
son applied this idea into modern mathematics in [117] and developed so-called
non-standard analysis. In the framework of non-standard analysis there were
obtained many interesting results examined in [37], [38], [74], [117].
There exists also a different version of mathematical analysis in that Archi-
medes’ axiom is rejected, namely, p-adic analysis (e.g., see: [20], [86], [91],
[116]). In this analysis, one investigates the properties of the completion of the
field Q of rational numbers with respect to the metric ρp(x, y) = |x−y|p, where
the norm | · |p called p-adic is defined as follows:
• |y|p = 0↔ y = 0,
• |x · y|p = |x|p · |y|p,
• |x+ y|p 6 max(|x|p, |y|p) (non-Archimedean triangular inequality).
That metric over the field Q is non-Archimedean, because |n · 1|p 6 1 for all
n ∈ Z. This completion of the field Q is called the field Qp of p-adic numbers.
In Qp there are infinitely large integers.
Nowadays there exist various many-valued logical systems (e.g., see Mali-
nowski’s book [92]). However, non-Archimedean and p-adic logical multiple-
validities were not yet systematically regarded. In this book, Schumann &
Smarandache define such multiple-validities and describe the basic proper-
ties of non-Archimedean and p-adic valued logical systems proposed by them in
[122], [123], [124], [125], [128], [132], [133]. At the same time, non-Archimedean
valued logics are constructed on the base of t-norm approach as fuzzy ones and
p-adic valued logics as discrete multi-valued systems.
Let us remember that the first logical multiple-valued system is proposed
by the Polish logician Jan  Lukasiewicz in [90]. For the first time he spoke
3
4about the idea of logical many-validity at Warsaw University on 7 March 1918
(Wyk lad poz˙egnalny wyg loszony w auli Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego w dniu 7
marca 1918 r., page 2). However  Lukasiewicz thought already about such a
logic and rejection of the Aristotelian principle of contradiction in 1910 (O za-
sadzie sprzecznos`ci u Arystotelesa, Krako´w 1910). Creating many-valued logic,
 Lukasiewicz was inspired philosophically. In the meantime, Post designed his
many-valued logic in 1921 in [105] independently and for combinatorial reasons
as a generalization of Boolean algebra.
The logical multi-validity that runs the unit interval [0, 1] with infinitely
small numbers for the first time was proposed by Smarandache in [132], [133],
[134], [135], [136]. The neutrosophic logic, as he named it, is conceived for a
philosophical explication of the neutrality concept. In this book, it is shown
that neutrosophic logic is a generalization of non-Archimedean and p-adic val-
ued logical systems.
In this book non-Archimedean and p-adic multiple-validities idea is regarded
as one of possible approaches to explicate the neutrality concept.
K. Trze¸sicki
Bia lystok, Poland
Preface
In this book, we consider various many-valued logics: standard, linear, hy-
perbolic, parabolic, non-Archimedean, p-adic, interval, neutrosophic, etc. We
survey also results which show the tree different proof-theoretic frameworks for
many-valued logics, e.g. frameworks of the following deductive calculi: Hilbert’s
style, sequent, and hypersequent. Recall that hypersequents are a natural gen-
eralization of Gentzen’s style sequents that was introduced independently by
Avron and Pottinger. In particular, we examine Hilbert’s style, sequent,
and hypersequent calculi for infinite-valued logics based on the three fundamen-
tal continuous t-norms:  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Product logics.
We present a general way that allows to construct systematically analytic
calculi for a large family of non-Archimedean many-valued logics: hyperrational-
valued, hyperreal-valued, and p-adic valued logics characterized by a special for-
mat of semantics with an appropriate rejection of Archimedes’ axiom. These
logics are built as different extensions of standard many-valued logics (namely,
 Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, Product, and Post’s logics).
The informal sense of Archimedes’ axiom is that anything can be mea-
sured by a ruler. Also logical multiple-validity without Archimedes’ axiom
consists in that the set of truth values is infinite and it is not well-founded and
well-ordered.
We consider two cases of non-Archimedean multi-valued logics: the first with
many-validity in the interval [0, 1] of hypernumbers and the second with many-
validity in the ring Zp of p-adic integers. Notice that in the second case we set
discrete infinite-valued logics. The following logics are investigated:
• hyperrational valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Product logics,
• hyperreal valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Product logics,
• p-adic valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Post’s logics.
In [67] Ha´jek classifies truth-functional fuzzy logics as logics whose conjunc-
tion and implication are interpreted via continuous t-norms and their residua.
Fundamental logics for this classification are  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s and
5
6Product ones. Further, Ha´jek proposes basic fuzzy logic BL which has va-
lidity in all logics based on continuous t-norms. In this book, for the first time
we consider hypervalued and p-adic valued extensions of basic fuzzy logic BL.
On the base of non-Archimedean valued logics, we construct non-Archimede-
an valued interval neutrosophic logic INL by which we can describe neutrality
phenomena. This logic is obtained by adding to the truth valuation a truth
triple t, i, f instead of one truth value t, where t is a truth-degree, i is an
indeterminacy-degree, and f is a falsity-degree. Each parameter of this triple
runs either the unit interval [0, 1] of hypernumbers or the ring Zp of p-adic in-
tegers.
A. Schumann & F. Smarandache
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Neutrality concept in logic
Every point of view A tends to be neutralized, diminished, balanced by Non-A.
At the same time, in between A and Non-A there are infinitely many points of
view Neut-A. Let’s note by A an idea, or proposition, theory, event, concept,
entity, by Non-A what is not A, and by Anti-A the opposite of A. Neut-Ameans
what is neither A nor Anti-A, i.e. neutrality is also in between the two extremes.
The classical logic, also called Boolean logic by the name of British mathe-
matician G. Boole, is two-valued. Thus, neutralities are ignored in this logic.
Peirce, before 1910, developed a semantics for three-valued logic in an un-
published note, but Post’s dissertation [105] and  Lukasiewicz’s work [90] are
cited for originating the three-valued logic. Here 1 is used for truth, 12 for in-
determinacy, and 0 for falsehood. These truth values can be understood as A,
Neut-A, Non-A respectively. For example, in three valued  Lukasiewicz’s logic
the negation of 12 gives
1
2 again, i.e. the neutrality negation is the neutrality
again.
However, we can consider neutralities as degrees between truth and false-
hood. In this case we must set multiple-valued logics.
The n-valued logics were developed by  Lukasiewicz in [89], [90]. The prac-
tical applications of infinite valued logic, where the truth-value may be any
number in the closed unit interval [0, 1], are regarded by Zadeh in [153]. This
logic is called fuzzy one.
In the meantime, the ancient Indian logic (nya¯ya) considered four possible
values of a statement: ‘true (only)’, ‘false (only)’, ‘both true and false’, and
‘neither true nor false’. The Buddhist logic added a fifth value to the previous
ones, ‘none of these’.
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As we see, we can get the neutralities in the framework of many-valued log-
ics. There is also an other way, when we set neutralities as the main property
of two-valued logical calculi. Namely, it is possible to develop systems where
the principle of classical logic, which entails that from contradictory premises
any formula can be derived, in symbols: α∧¬α ⊢ β, is violated. It is called the
Duns Scotus law, which is valid not only in classical logic, but in almost all
the known logical systems, like intuicionistic logic.
For the first time the Russian logician N. Vasil’e`v proposed in [149] and
[150] to violate the Duns Scotus law, who perceived that the rejection of the
law of non-contradiction could lead to a non-Aristotelian logic in the same way
as the violation of the parallel postulate of Euclidean geometry had conduced
to non-Euclidean geometry.
The other logician who discussed the possibility of violating the ancient Aris-
totelian principle of contradiction was the Polish logician J.  Lukasiewicz, but
he did not elaborate any logical system to cope with his intuitions. His idea was
developed by S. Jas`kowski in [62], who constructed a system of propositional
paraconsistent logic, where he distinguished between contradictory (inconsis-
tent) systems and trivial ones.
Vasil’e`v and  Lukasiewicz were the forerunners of paraconsistent logic in
which it is devoted to the study of logical systems which can base on inconsis-
tent theories (i.e., theories which have contradictory theses, like α and ¬α) but
which are not trivial (in the sense that not every well formed formula of their
languages are also axioms).
In this book we will investigate so-called non-Archimedean multiple-valued
logics, especially non-Archimedean valued fuzzy logics, in which we have the
violation the Duns Scotus law too.
1.2 Neutrality and non-Archimedean logical mul-
tiple-validity
The development of fuzzy logic and fuzziness was motivated in large measure
by the need for a conceptual framework which can address the issue of uncer-
tainty and lexical imprecision. Recall that fuzzy logic was introduced by Lotfi
Zadeh in 1965 (see [153]) to represent data and information possessing nonsta-
tistical uncertainties. Florentin Smarandache had generalized fuzzy logic and
introduced two new concepts (see [132], [133], [134]):
1. neutrosophy as study of neutralities;
2. neutrosophic logic and neutrosophic probability as a mathematical model
11
of uncertainty, vagueness, ambiguity, imprecision, undefined, unknown,
incompleteness, inconsistency, redundancy, contradiction, etc.
Neutrosophy proposed by Smarandache in [134] is a new branch of philoso-
phy, which studies the nature of neutralities, as well as their logical applications.
This branch represents a version of paradoxism studies. The essence of para-
doxism studies is that there is a neutrality for any two extremes. For example,
denote by A an idea (or proposition, event, concept), by Anti-A the opposite
to A. Then there exists a neutrality Neut-A and this means that something is
neither A nor Anti-A. It is readily seen that the paradoxical reasoning can be
modelled if some elements θi of a frame Θ are not exclusive, but non-exclusive,
i.e., here θi have a non-empty intersection. A mathematical model that has
such a property is called the Dezert-Smarandache model (DSm model). A
theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning that studies DSm models is called
the Dezert-Smarandache theory (DSmT). It is totally different from those
of all existing approaches managing uncertainties and fuzziness. In this book,
we consider plausible reasoning on the base of particular case of infinite DSm
models, namely, on the base of non-Archimedean structures.
Let us remember that Archimedes’ axiom is the formula of infinite length
that has one of two following notations:
• for any ε that belongs to the interval [0, 1], we have
(ε > 0)→ [(ε ≥ 1) ∨ (ε+ ε ≥ 1) ∨ (ε+ ε+ ε ≥ 1) ∨ . . .], (1.1)
• for any positive integer ε, we have
[(1 ≥ ε) ∨ (1 + 1 ≥ ε) ∨ (1 + 1 + 1 ≥ ε) ∨ . . .]. (1.2)
Formulas (1.1) and (1.2) are valid in the field Q of rational numbers and as
well as in the field R of real numbers. In the ring Z of integers, only formula
(1.2) has a nontrivial sense, because Z doesn’t contain numbers of the open
interval (0, 1).
Also, Archimedes’ axiom affirms the existence of an integer multiple of
the smaller of two numbers which exceeds the greater: for any positive real or
rational number ε, there exists a positive integer n such that ε ≥ 1
n
or n · ε ≥ 1.
The negation of Archimedes’ axiom has one of two following forms:
• there exists ε that belongs to the interval [0, 1] such that
(ε > 0) ∧ [(ε < 1) ∧ (ε+ ε < 1) ∧ (ε+ ε+ ε < 1) ∧ . . .], (1.3)
• there exists a positive integer ε such that
[(1 < ε) ∧ (1 + 1 < ε) ∧ (1 + 1 + 1 < ε) ∧ . . .]. (1.4)
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Let us show that (1.3) is the negation of (1.1). Indeed,
¬∀ε [(ε > 0)→ [(ε ≥ 1) ∨ (ε+ ε ≥ 1) ∨ (ε+ ε+ ε ≥ 1) ∨ . . .]]↔
∃ε¬¬[(ε > 0) ∧ ¬[(ε ≥ 1) ∨ (ε+ ε ≥ 1) ∨ (ε+ ε+ ε ≥ 1) ∨ . . .]]↔
∃ε [(ε > 0) ∧ [¬(ε ≥ 1) ∧ ¬(ε+ ε ≥ 1) ∧ ¬(ε+ ε+ ε ≥ 1) ∧ . . .]]↔
∃ε [(ε > 0) ∧ [(ε < 1) ∧ (ε+ ε < 1) ∧ (ε+ ε+ ε < 1) ∧ . . .]]
It is obvious that formula (1.3) says that there exist infinitely small numbers
(or infinitesimals), i.e., numbers that are smaller than all real or rational num-
bers of the open interval (0, 1). In other words, ε is said to be an infinitesimal
if and only if, for all positive integers n, we have |ε| < 1
n
. Further, formula
(1.4) says that there exist infinitely large integers that are greater than all pos-
itive integers. Infinitesimals and infinitely large integers are called nonstandard
numbers or actual infinities .
The field that satisfies all properties of R without Archimedes’ axiom is
called the field of hyperreal numbers and it is denoted by ∗R. The field that
satisfies all properties of Q without Archimedes’ axiom is called the field of
hyperrational numbers and it is denoted by ∗Q. By definition of field, if ε ∈ R
(respectively ε ∈ Q), then 1/ε ∈ R (respectively 1/ε ∈ Q). Therefore ∗R and
∗Q contain simultaneously infinitesimals and infinitely large integers: for an
infinitesimal ε, we have N = 1
ε
, where N is an infinitely large integer.
The ring that satisfies all properties of Z without Archimedes’ axiom is
called the ring of hyperintegers and it is denoted by ∗Z. This ring includes
infinitely large integers. Notice that there exists a version of ∗Z that is called
the ring of p-adic integers and is denoted by Zp.
We will show that nonstandard numbers (actual infinities) are non-exclusive
elements. This means that their intersection isn’t empty with some other ele-
ments. Therefore non-Archimedean structures of the form ∗S (where we obtain
∗S on the base of the set S of exclusive elements) are particular case of the DSm
model. These structures satisfy the properties:
1. all members of S are exclusive and S ⊂ ∗S,
2. all members of ∗S\S are non-exclusive,
3. if a member a is non-exclusive, then there exists an exclusive member b
such that a ∩ b 6= ∅,
4. there exist non-exclusive members a, b such that a ∩ b 6= ∅,
5. each positive non-exclusive member is greater (or less) than each positive
exclusive member.
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We will consider the following principal versions of the logic on non-Archi-
medean structures:
• hyperrational valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Product logics,
• hyperreal valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Product logics,
• p-adic valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Post’s logics.
For the first time non-Archimedean logical multiple-validities were regarded
by Schumann in [122], [123], [124], [125], [128], [129].
The non-Archimedean structures are not well-founded and well-ordered.
Also, the logical neutrality may be examined as non-well-ordered mul-
tiple validity, i.e. as non-Archimedean one. Two elements are neutral in
a true sense if both are incompatible by the ordering relation.
1.3 Neutrality and neutrosophic logic
The non-Archimedean valued logic can be generalized to a neutrosophic logic,
where the truth values of ∗[0, 1] are extended to truth triples of the form
〈t, i, f〉 ⊆ (∗[0, 1])3, where t is the truth-degree, i the indeterminacy-degree, f
the falsity-degree and they are approximated by non-standard subsets of ∗[0, 1],
and these subsets may overlap and exceed the unit interval in the sense of the
non-Archimedean analysis.
Neutrosophic logic was introduced by Smarandache in [132], [133]. It is an
alternative to the existing logics, because it represents a mathematical model
of uncertainty on non-Archimedean structures. It is a non-classical logic in
which each proposition is estimated to have the percentage of truth in a subset
t ⊆ ∗[0, 1], the percentage of indeterminacy in a subset i ⊆ ∗[0, 1], and the
percentage of falsity in a subset f ⊆ ∗[0, 1]. Thus, neutrosophic logic is a formal
frame trying to measure the truth, indeterminacy, and falsehood simultaneously,
therefore it generalizes:
• Boolean logic (i = ∅, t and f consist of either 0 or 1);
• n-valued logic (i = ∅, t and f consist of members 0, 1, . . . , n− 1);
• fuzzy logic (i = ∅, t and f consist of members of [0, 1]).
In simple neutrosophic logic, where t, i, f are singletons, the tautologies
have the truth value 〈∗1, ∗0, ∗0〉, the contradictions the value 〈∗0, ∗1, ∗1〉. While
for a paradox, we have the truth value 〈∗1, ∗1, ∗1〉. Indeed, the paradox is the
only proposition true and false in the same time in the same world, and in-
determinate as well! We can assume that some statements are indeterminate
in all possible worlds, i.e. that there exists “absolute indeterminacy” 〈∗1, ∗1, ∗1〉.
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The idea of tripartition (truth, indeterminacy, falsehood) appeared in 1764
when J. H. Lambert investigated the credibility of one witness affected by the
contrary testimony of another. He generalized Hooper’s rule of combination
of evidence (1680s), which was a non-Bayesian approach to find a probabilistic
model. Koopman in 1940s introduced the notions of lower and upper proba-
bility, followed by Good, and Dempster (1967) gave a rule of combining two
arguments. Shafer (1976) extended it to the Dempster-Shafer theory of
belief functions by defining the belief and plausibility functions and using the
rule of inference of Dempster for combining two evidences proceeding from
two different sources. Belief function is a connection between fuzzy reasoning
and probability.
The Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions is a generalization of the
Bayesian probability (Bayes 1760s, Laplace 1780s); this uses the mathemati-
cal probability in a more general way, and is based on probabilistic combination
of evidence in artificial intelligence. In Lambert’s opinion, “there is a chance
p that the witness will be faithful and accurate, a chance q that he will be men-
dacious, and a chance 1 − p− q that he will simply be careless”. Therefore we
have three components: accurate, mendacious, careless, which add up to 1.
Atanassov (see [3], [4]) used the tripartition to give five generalizations of
the fuzzy set, studied their properties and applications to the neural networks
in medicine:
• Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set (IFS): given an universe U , an IFS A over U is a
set of ordered triples 〈universe element, degree of membership M , degree
of non-membership N〉 such that M + N 6 1 and M,N ∈ [0, 1]. When
M + N = 1 one obtains the fuzzy set, and if M + N < 1 there is an
indeterminacy I = 1−M −N .
• Intuitionistic L-Fuzzy Set (ILFS): Is similar to IFS, but M and N belong
to a fixed lattice L.
• Interval-valued Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set (IVIFS): Is similar to IFS, but M
and N are subsets of [0, 1] and maxM +maxN 6 1.
• Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set of Second Type (IFS2): Is similar to IFS, but
M2 + N2 6 1. M and N are inside of the upper right quarter of unit
circle.
• Temporal IFS : Is similar to IFS, but M and N are functions of the time-
moment too.
However, sometimes a too large generalization may have no practical impact.
Such unification theories, or attempts, have been done in the history of sciences.
Einstein tried in physics to build a Unifying Field Theory that seeks to unite
the properties of gravitational, electromagnetic, weak, and strong interactions
so that a single set of equations can be used to predict all their characteristics;
15
whether such a theory may be developed it is not known at the present.
Dezert suggested to develop practical applications of neutrosophic logic
(see [135], [136]), e.g. for solving certain practical problems posed in the domain
of research in Data/Information fusion.
16
Chapter 2
First-order logical language
2.1 Preliminaries
Let us remember some basic logical definitions.
Definition 1 A first-order logical language L consists of the following symbols:
1. Variables: (i) Free variables: a0, a1, a2, . . . , aj , . . . (j ∈ ω). (ii) Bound
variables: x0, x1, x2, . . . , xj , . . . (j ∈ ω)
2. Constants: (i) Function symbols of arity i (i ∈ ω): F i0, F
i
1 , F
i
2, . . . , F
i
j , . . .
(j ∈ ω). Nullary function symbols are called individual constants. (ii)
Predicate symbols of arity i (i ∈ ω): P i0 , P
i
1, P
i
2, . . . , P
i
j , . . . (j ∈ ω).
Nullary predicate symbols are called truth constants.
3. Logical symbols: (i) Propositional connectives of arity nj : 
n0
0 , 
n1
1 , . . . ,
nrr . (ii) Quantifiers: Q0,Q1, . . . ,Qq.
4. Auxiliary symbols: (, ), and , (comma).
Terms are inductively defined as follows:
1. Every individual constant is a term.
2. Every free variable is a term.
3. If Fn is a function symbol of arity n, and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then
Fn(t1, . . . , tn) is a term.
Formulas are inductively defined as follows:
1. If Pn is a predicate symbol of arity n, and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then
Pn(t1, . . . , tn) is a formula. It is called atomic or an atom. It has no
outermost logical symbol.
17
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2. If ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn are formulas and 
n is a propositional connective of arity
n, then n(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn) is a formula with outermost logical symbol 
n.
3. If ϕ is a formula not containing the bound variable x, a is a free variable
and Q is a quantifier, then Qxϕ(x), where ϕ(x) is obtained from ϕ by
replacing a by x at every occurrence of a in ϕ, is a formula. Its outermost
logical symbol is Q.
A formula is called open if it contains free variables, and closed otherwise.
A formula without quantifiers is called quantifier-free. We denote the set of
formulas of a language L by L.
We will write ϕ(x) for a formula possibly containing the bound variable x,
and ϕ(a) (resp. ϕ(t)) for the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every oc-
currence of the variable x by the free variable a (resp. the term t).
Hence, we shall need meta-variables for the symbols of a language L. As
a notational convention we use letters ϕ, φ, ψ, . . . to denote formulas, letters
Γ,∆,Λ, . . . for sequences and sets of formulas.
Definition 2 A matrix, or matrix logic, M for a language L is given by:
1. a nonempty set of truth values V of cardinality |V | = m,
2. a subset V+ ⊆ V of designated truth values,
3. an algebra with domain V of appropriate type: for every n-place connective
 of L there is an associated truth function ˜: V n → V , and
4. for every quantifier Q, an associated truth function Q˜: ℘(V )\∅ → V
Notice that a truth function for quantifiers is a mapping from nonempty
sets of truth values to truth values: for a non-empty set M ⊆ V , a quantified
formula Qxϕ(x) takes the truth value Q˜(M) if, for every truth value v ∈ V , it
holds that v ∈ M iff there is a domain element d such that the truth value of
ϕ in this point d is v (all relative to some interpretation). The set M is called
the distribution of ϕ. For example, suppose that there are only the universal
quantifier ∀ and the existential quantifier ∃ in L. Further, we have the set of
truth values V = {⊤,⊥}, where ⊥ is false and ⊤ is true, i.e. the set of designated
truth values V+ = {⊤}. Then we define the truth functions for the quantifiers
∀ and ∃ as follows:
∀˜({⊤}) = ⊤,
∃˜({⊥}) = ⊥,
∀˜({⊤,⊥}) = ∀˜({⊥}) = ⊥,
∃˜({⊤,⊥}) = ∃˜({⊤}) = ⊤
Also, a matrix logic M for a language L is an algebraic system M = 〈V , ˜0,
˜1, . . . , ˜r, Q˜0, Q˜1, . . . , Q˜q, V+〉, where
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1. V is a nonempty set of truth values for well-formed formulas of L,
2. ˜0, ˜1, . . . , ˜r are a set of matrix operations defined on the set V and
assigned to corresponding propositional connectives n00 ,
n1
1 , . . . ,
nr
r of
L,
3. Q˜0, Q˜1, . . . , Q˜q are a set of matrix operations defined on the set V and
assigned to corresponding quantifiers Q0,Q1, . . . ,Qq of L,
4. V+ is a set of designated truth values such that V+ ⊆ V .
A structure M = 〈D,Φ〉 for a language L (an L-structure) consists of the
following:
1. A non-empty set D, called the domain (elements of D are called individ-
uals).
2. A mapping Φ that satisfies the following:
(a) Each n-ary function symbol F of L is mapped to a function F˜ : Dn →
D if n > 0, or to an element of D if n = 0.
(b) Each n-ary predicate symbol P of L is mapped to a function P˜ :
Dn → V if n > 0, or to and element of V if n = 0.
LetM be an L-structure. An assignment s is a mapping from the free variables
of L to individuals.
Definition 3 An L-structure M = 〈D,Φ〉 together with an assignment s is
said to be an interpretation I = 〈M, s〉.
Let I = 〈〈D,Φ〉, s〉 be an interpretation. Then we can extend the mapping
Φ to a mapping ΦI from terms to individuals:
• If a is a free variable, then ΦI(a) = s(a).
• If t is of the form F (t1, . . . , tn), where F is a function symbol of arity n
and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then ΦI(t) = Φ(f)ΦI(t1) . . .ΦI(tn)).
Definition 4 Given an interpretation I = 〈M, s〉, we define the valuation valI
to be a mapping from formulas ϕ of L to truth values as follows:
1. If ϕ is atomic, i.e., of the form P (t1, . . . , tn), where P is a predicate symbol
of arity n and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then valI(ϕ) = Φ(P )(ΦI(t1) . . .ΦI(tn)).
2. If the outermost logical symbol of ϕ is a propositional connective  of arity
n, i.e., ϕ is of the form (ψ1, . . . , ψn), where ψ1, . . . , ψn are formulas, then
valI(ϕ) = ˜(valI(ψ1), . . . , valI(ψn)).
3. If the outermost logical symbol of ϕ is a quantifier Q, i.e., ϕ is of the form
Qx ψ(x), then
valI(ϕ) = Q˜(
⋃
d∈D
valI(ψ(d))).
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Suppose |V | > 2. A formula ϕ is said to be logically valid (e.g. it is a many-
valued tautology) iff, for every interpretation I, it holds that valI(ϕ) ∈ V+.
Sometimes, a logically valid formula ψ is denoted by |= ψ.
SupposeM is a structure for L, and ϕ a formula of L. A formula ϕ is called
satisfiable iff there is an interpretation I such that valI(ϕ) ∈ V+. A satisfiable
formula is denoted by M |= ϕ. This means that ϕ is satisfiable on M for every
assignment s. In this case M is called a model of ϕ.
If Γ is a set of formulas, we will write M |= Γ if M |= γ for every formula
γ ∈ Γ, and say that M is a model of Γ or that M satisfies Γ.
Suppose Γ is a set of formulas of L and ψ is a formula of L. Then Γ implies
ψ, written as Γ |= ψ, if M |= ψ whenever M |= Γ for every structure M for L.
If Γ and ∆ are sets of formulas of L, then Γ implies ∆, written as Γ |= ∆, if
M |= ∆ whenever M |= Γ for every structure M for L.
Suppose x is a variable, t is a term, and ϕ is a formula. Then the fact that
t is substitutable for x in ϕ is defined as follows:
1. If ϕ is atomic, then t is substitutable for x in ϕ.
2. If ϕ is (ψ1, . . . , ψn), then t is substitutable for x in ϕ if and only if t is
substitutable for x in ψ1, t is substitutable for x in ψn, etc.
3. If ϕ is ∀y ψ, then t is substitutable for x in ϕ if and only if either
(a) x does not occur free in ϕ, or
(b) if y does not occur in t and t is substitutable for x in ψ.
2.2 Hilbert’s type calculus for classical logic
Definition 5 Classical logic is built in the framework of the language L and the
valuation valI of its formulas is a mapping to truth values 0, 1 that is defined
as follows:
• valI(¬α) = 1− valI(α),
• valI(α ∨ β) = max(valI(α), valI(β)),
• valI(α ∧ β) = min(valI(α), valI(β)),
• valI(α→ β) =
{
0, if valI(α) = 1 and valI(β) = 0
1, otherwise.
Consider Hilbert’s calculus for classical logic (see [71], [72]). Its axiom
schemata are as follows:
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ψ → (ϕ→ ψ), (2.1)
(ψ → ϕ)→ ((ψ → (ϕ→ χ))→ (ψ → χ)), (2.2)
(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ, (2.3)
(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ψ, (2.4)
(χ→ ϕ)→ ((χ→ ψ)→ (χ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ))), (2.5)
ψ → (ψ ∨ ϕ), (2.6)
ϕ→ (ψ ∨ ϕ), (2.7)
(ϕ→ χ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ ((ϕ ∨ ψ)→ χ)), (2.8)
(ϕ→ χ)→ (ϕ→ ¬χ)→ ¬ϕ), (2.9)
¬¬ϕ→ ϕ, (2.10)
∀xϕ(x)→ ϕ[x/t], (2.11)
ϕ[x/t]→ ∃xϕ(x), (2.12)
where the formula ϕ[x/t] is the result of substituting the term t for all free
occurrences of x in ϕ.
In Hilbert’s calculus there are the following inference rules:
1. Modus ponens : if two formulas ϕ and ϕ → ψ hold, then we deduce a
formula ψ:
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
.
2. Universal generalization:
ϕ→ ψ(a)
ϕ→ ∀xψ(x)
,
where a is not free in the expression ϕ.
3. Existential generalization:
ϕ(a)→ ψ
∃xϕ(x)→ ψ
.
where a is not free in the expression ψ.
Definition 6 Let Σ be a set of formulas. A deduction or proof from Σ in L is
a finite sequence ϕ1ϕ2 . . . ϕn of formulas such that for each k ≤ n,
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1. ϕk is an axiom, or
2. ϕk ∈ Σ, or
3. there are i1, . . . , in < k such that ϕk follows from ϕi1 ,. . . , ϕin by inference
rules.
A formula of Σ appearing in the deduction is called a premiss. Σ proves a
formula α, written as Σ ⊢ α, if α is the last formula of a deduction from Σ.
We’ll usually write ⊢ α for ∅ ⊢ α.
A formula α such that ⊢ α is called provable. It is evident that all formulas
of the form (2.1) – (2.10) are provable.
As an example, show that ⊢ ψ → ψ.
At the first step, take axiom schema (2.1):
ψ → ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ).
At the second step, take axiom schema (2.2):
(ψ → (ϕ→ ψ))→ ((ψ → ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ))→ (ψ → ψ)).
At the third step, using axiom schema (2.1) and the formula of the second
step we obtain by modus ponens the following expression:
(ψ → ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ))→ (ψ → ψ).
At the last step, using the formula of the first step and the formula of the
third step we obtain by modus ponens that
ψ → ψ.
Further, we will consider the proof and the provability for various Hilbert’s
type nonclassical calculi just in the sense of definition 6.
Theorem 1 (Soundness and Completeness Theorem) Let α be a formula
and ∆ be a set of formulas of classical logic.
∆ |= α if and only if ∆ ⊢ α. ✷
2.3 Sequent calculus for classical logic
Let us remember that the sequent calculus for usual two-valued logic was pro-
posed by Gentzen in [52].
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By his definition, a sequent is an expression of the form Γ1 →֒ Γ2, where
Γ1 = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕj}, Γ2 = {ψ1, . . . , ψi} are finite sets of formulas of the language
L, that has the following interpretation: Γ1 →֒ Γ2 is logically valid iff∧
j
ϕj →
∨
i
ψi
is logically valid.
Also, we read such a sequent as: “ϕ1 and . . . and ϕj entails ψ1 or . . . or ψi”.
A sequent of the form ∅ →֒ Γ is denoted by →֒ Γ. A sequent of the form
Γ →֒ ∅ is denoted by Γ →֒.
The inference rules are expressions containing formula variables ϕ, ψ, . . . and
multisets of formulas variables Γ, ∆, . . . such that replacing these with actual
formulas and multisets of formulas, gives ordered pairs consisting of a sequent S
(the conclusion) and a finite set of sequents S1, . . . , Sn (the premises, written:
S1,...,Sn
S
). Rules where n = 0 are called the initial sequents or axioms.
The only axiom of the sequent calculus for classical logic is as follows:
ψ →֒ ψ.
The inference rules :
1. Structural rules:
Γ1 →֒ Γ2
ψ,Γ1 →֒ Γ2
,
Γ1 →֒ Γ2
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ
(the left and right weakening rules respectively),
ψ, ψ,Γ1 →֒ Γ2
ψ,Γ1 →֒ Γ2
,
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ, ψ
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ
(the left and right contraction rules respectively),
Γ1, ψ, χ,∆ →֒ Γ2
Γ1, χ, ψ,∆ →֒ Γ2
,
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ, χ,∆
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, χ, ψ,∆
.
(the left and right exchange rules respectively).
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2. Logical rules, where (#⇒) and (⇒ #) are the left and right introduction
rules for a connective # ∈ {¬,→,∨,∧, ∀, ∃} respectively:
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ
Γ1,¬ψ →֒ Γ2
(¬ ⇒),
Γ1, ψ →֒ Γ2
Γ1 →֒ Γ2,¬ψ
(⇒ ¬),
ψ, χ,Γ1 →֒ Γ2
ψ ∧ χ,Γ1 →֒ Γ2
(∧ ⇒),
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ Γ1 →֒ Γ2, χ
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ ∧ χ
(⇒ ∧),
Γ1, ψ →֒ Γ2 Γ1, χ →֒ Γ2
Γ1, ψ ∨ χ →֒ Γ2
(∨ ⇒),
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ, χ
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ ∨ χ
(⇒ ∨),
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ χ,∆1 →֒ ∆2
ψ → χ,Γ1,∆1 →֒ Γ2,∆2
(→⇒),
ψ,Γ1 →֒ Γ2, χ
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ψ → χ
(⇒→),
ϕ[x/t],Γ1 →֒ Γ2
∀x ϕ(x),Γ1 →֒ Γ2
(∀ ⇒),
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ϕ(a)
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ∀x ϕ(x)
(⇒ ∀),
ϕ(a),Γ1 →֒ Γ2
∃x ϕ(x),Γ1 →֒ Γ2
(∃ ⇒),
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ϕ[x/t]
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, ∃x ϕ(x)
(⇒ ∃),
where the formula ϕ[x/t] is the result of substituting the term t for all free
occurrences of x in ϕ, a has no occurrences in the below sequent.
3. Cut rule:
Γ1 →֒ ∆1, ψ ψ,Γ2 →֒ ∆2
Γ1,Γ2 →֒ ∆1,∆2
.
Definition 7 A proof (or derivation) for a sequent calculus of a sequent S from
a set of sequents U is a finite tree such that:
• S is the root of the tree and is called the end-sequent.
• The leaves of the tree are all initial sequents or members of U .
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• Each child node of the tree is obtained from its parent nodes by an inference
rule, i.e. if S is a child node of S1, . . . , Sn, then
S1,...,Sn
S
is an instance
of a rule.
If we have a proof tree with the root S and U = ∅, then S is called a provable
sequent. If we have a proof tree with the root S and U 6= ∅, then S is called a
derivable sequent from premisses U .
It can be easily shown that for every formula ψ of L, we have that ⊢ ψ if
and only if →֒ ψ is a provable sequent.
Further, we will consider the proof and the provability for various nonclas-
sical sequent and hypersequent calculi just in the sense of definition 7.
As an example, using the above mentioned inference rules, show that the
following proposition (ψ ∧ (ϕ ∨ χ)) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ (ψ ∧ χ)) of classical logic is
provable:
1.
ψ →֒ ψ ϕ →֒ ϕ χ →֒ χ
ψ, ϕ →֒ ψ ψ, ϕ →֒ ϕ ψ, χ →֒ ψ ψ, χ →֒ χ
,
2.
ψ, ϕ →֒ ψ ψ, ϕ →֒ ϕ ψ, χ →֒ ψ ψ, χ →֒ χ
ψ, ϕ →֒ ψ ∧ ϕ ψ, χ →֒ ψ ∧ χ
,
3.
ψ, ϕ →֒ ψ ∧ ϕ ψ, χ →֒ ψ ∧ χ
ψ, ϕ →֒ ψ ∧ ϕ, ψ ψ, ϕ →֒ ψ ∧ ϕ, χ ψ, χ →֒ ψ ∧ χ, ψ ψ, χ →֒ ψ ∧ χ, ϕ
,
4.
ψ, ϕ →֒ ψ ∧ ϕ, ψ ψ, ϕ →֒ ψ ∧ ϕ, χ ψ, χ →֒ ψ ∧ χ, ψ ψ, χ →֒ ψ ∧ χ, ϕ
ψ, ϕ →֒ ψ ∧ ϕ, ψ ∧ χ ψ, χ →֒ ψ ∧ χ, ψ ∧ ϕ
,
5.
ψ, ϕ →֒ ψ ∧ ϕ, ψ ∧ χ ψ, χ →֒ ψ ∧ χ, ψ ∧ ϕ
ψ, ϕ ∨ χ →֒ ψ ∧ ϕ, ψ ∧ χ
,
6.
ψ, ϕ ∨ χ →֒ ψ ∧ ϕ, ψ ∧ χ
ψ ∧ (ϕ ∨ χ) →֒ (ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ (ψ ∧ χ)
.
7.
ψ ∧ (ϕ ∨ χ) →֒ (ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ (ψ ∧ χ)
→֒ (ψ ∧ (ϕ ∨ χ))→ ((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ (ψ ∧ χ))
.
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Chapter 3
n-valued  Lukasiewicz’s
logics
3.1 Preliminaries
For the first time the Polish logician Jan  Lukasiewicz began to create systems
of many-valued logic, using a third value “possible” to deal with Aristotle’s
paradox of the sea battle (see [90], [144]). Now many-valued logic has applica-
tions in diverse fields. In the earlier years of development of multiple-validity
idea, the most promising field of its application is artificial intelligence. This
application concerns vague notions and commonsense reasoning, e.g. in expert
systems. In this context fuzzy logic is also interesting, because multiple-validity
is modelled in artificial intelligence via fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic.
Now consider n-valued  Lukasiewicz’s matrix logic M Ln defined as the
ordered system 〈Vn, ¬L, →L, ∨, ∧, ∃˜, ∀˜, {n− 1}〉 for any n > 2, n ∈ N, where
1. Vn = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1},
2. for all x ∈ Vn, ¬Lx = (n− 1)− x,
3. for all x, y ∈ Vn, x→L y = min(n− 1, (n− 1)− x+ y),
4. for all x, y ∈ Vn, x ∨ y = (x→L y)→L y = max(x, y),
5. for all x, y ∈ Vn, x ∧ y = ¬L(¬Lx ∨ ¬Ly) = min(x, y),
6. for a subset M ⊆ Vn, ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ Vn, ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
8. {n− 1} is the set of designated truth values.
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The truth value 0 ∈ Vn is false, the truth value n− 1 ∈ Vn is true, and other
truth values x ∈ Vn\{0, n− 1} are neutral.
By Ln denote the set of all superpositions of the functions ¬L,→L, ∃˜, ∀˜.
We can construct various truth tables on the basis of n-valued  Lukasie-
wicz’s matrix logic.
1. The truth table for  Lukasiewicz’s negation in M Ln :
p ¬Lp
n− 1 0
n− 2 1
n− 3 2
. . . . . .
0 n− 1
2. The truth table for  Lukasiewicz’s implication in M Ln :
→L n− 1 n− 2 n− 3 . . . 0
n− 1 n− 1 n− 2 n− 3 . . . 0
n− 2 n− 1 n− 1 n− 2 . . . 1
n− 3 n− 1 n− 1 n− 1 . . . 2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 n− 1 n− 1 n− 1 . . . n− 1
3. The truth table for the disjunction in M Ln :
∨ n− 1 n− 2 n− 3 . . . 0
n− 1 n− 1 n− 1 n− 1 . . . n− 1
n− 2 n− 1 n− 2 n− 2 . . . n− 2
n− 3 n− 1 n− 2 n− 3 . . . n− 3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 n− 1 n− 2 n− 3 . . . 0
4. The truth table for the conjunction in M Ln :
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∧ n− 1 n− 2 n− 3 . . . 0
n− 1 n− 1 n− 2 n− 3 . . . 0
n− 2 n− 2 n− 2 n− 3 . . . 0
n− 3 n− 3 n− 3 n− 3 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 . . . 0
We can define different n-valued matrix logics according to the chose of dif-
ferent logical operations as initial ones. As an example, we considered n-valued
 Lukasiewicz’s matrix logic in which ¬L, →L, ∨, ∧ are basic operations.
Also, an n-valued logic M is given by a set of truth values V (M) = {0, 1,
2, . . . , n − 1}, the set of designated truth values V+(M), and a set of truth
functions ˜i: V (M)
i → V (M) for all connectives i.
We denote the set of tautologies of the matrix logic M by Taut(M). We
say that an n-valued logic M1 is better than M2 (M1 ⊳ M2) iff Taut(M1) ⊂
Taut(M2).
It is obvious that all n-valued propositional logics for a language L can be
enumerated mechanically:
Proposition 1 Assume that we have r propositional connectives ˜
mj
j of arity
mj (1 6 j 6 r). There are
r∏
j=1
nn
mj
many n-valued logics.
Proof. The number of different truth functions V mj → V equals∣∣V Vmj ∣∣ = nnmj . ✷
Proposition 2 For any truth function ˜i: V (M)i → V (M) and for any subset
of truth values W ⊆ V there exists disjunctive clauses Φj(x1, . . . , xi) of the form
(x1 ∈ Rj,1 ∨ . . .∨ xi ∈ Rj,i) where Rj,k are subsets of V , with 1 6 j 6 ni−1 and
1 6 k 6 i, such that for all x1, . . . , xi ∈ V :
˜i(x1, . . . , xi) ∈ W ↔
ni−1∧
j=1
Φj(x1, . . . , xi).
Proof. See [16]. ✷
This proposition allows any truth function to be regarded as a conjunctive
normal form.
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3.2 Originality of (p+1)-valued  Lukasiewicz’s log-
ics
The algebraic system MPn+1 = 〈Vn+1,¬P , ∨, {n}〉, where
1. Vn+1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n},
2. ¬Px = x+ 1 mod (n+ 1),
3. x ∨ y = max(x, y),
4. {n} is the set of designated truth values (verum),
is said to be the (n+1)-valued Postian matrix (it is proposed by Post in [105]).
Let Pn+1 be the set of all functions of the (n+ 1)-ary Postian matrix logic.
We say that the system F of functions is precomplete in Pn+1 if F isn’t a
complete set, but the adding to F any function f such that f ∈ Pn+1 and
f 6∈ F converts F into a complete set. As an example, take the set of all func-
tions in Pn+1 preserving 0 and n. Denote this set by Tn+1. By assumption,
f(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Tn+1 iff f(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ {0, n}, where xi ∈ {0, n}, 1 6 i 6 m.
The class Tn+1 of functions is precomplete.
It is known that we can specify each (p + 1)-valued  Lukasiewicz matrix
logic for any prime number p (see [77]):
Theorem 2 Ln+1 = Tn+1 iff n (for any n > 2) is a prime number. ✷
This means that the set of logical functions in the logic M Lp+1 , where p is
a prime number, forms a precomplete set.
Corollary 4. 1 Suppose there exists the infinite sequence of (ps + 1)-valued
 Lukasiewicz’s matrix logics M Lps+1
( ps is s-th prime number). Then for
each precomplete sets Tps+1 of functions we have that Lps+1 = Tps+1 for all
s = 1, 2, . . . ✷
Take the sequence of finite-valued  Lukasiewicz matrix logics
M L2+1 ,M L3+1 ,M L5+1 ,M L7+1 , . . .
We can show that it is sufficient if we consider just this sequence instead of
the sequence of all finite-valued  Lukasiewicz’s logics M L2+1 , M L3+1 , M L4+1 ,
M L5+1 , M L6+1 , . . . (it was considered by Karpenko in [76], [77]).
Indeed, let ϕ(n) be Euler’s function, i.e., the function defined for all pos-
itive integers n and equal to a number k of integers such that k 6 n and k is
relatively prime to n. Now assume that ϕ∗(n) = ϕ(n)+1. It is necessary to no-
tice that if n = p, then ϕ∗(n) = (p−1)+1 = p. Therefore we have the following
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algorithm, by which any natural number n is assigned to a prime number p and
hence we assign any logic M Ln+1 to a logic M Lp+1 :
0. Let n = n1 and n1 6= pi.
1. Either ϕ∗1(n1) = pi or ϕ
∗
1(n1) = n2, where n2 < n1.
2. Either ϕ∗2(n2) = pi or ϕ
∗
2(n2) = n3, where n3 < n2.
...
k. ϕ∗k(nk) = pi, i.e., by ϕ
∗
k(n) denote k-th application of the function ϕ
∗(n).
Since there exists the above mentioned algorithm, it follows that the func-
tion ϕ∗k(nk) induces a partition from sets Ln+1 into their equivalence classes:
Ln1+1
∼= Ln2+1 iff there exist k and l such that ϕ
∗
k(n1) = ϕ
∗
l (n2).
By Xps+1 denote equivalence classes. Every class contains a unique pre-
complete set Lp+1. Using inverse Euler’s function ϕ
−1(n), it is possible to set
the algorithm that takes each precomplete set Lp+1 to an equivalence class Xp+1.
Further, let us consider the inverse function ϕ∗−1(m). We may assume that
m = p, where p is a prime number.
0. We subtract 1 from p, i.e., we have p− 1.
1. We set the range of values for ϕ−1(p − 1). By assumption, this family
consists of two classes {νo}1 and {νe}1, where {νo}1 is the class of odd values, p
isn’t contained in {νo}1, and {νe}1 is the class of even values. By construction,
we disregard the class {νe}i for any i, because νe − 1 is the odd number and
consequently cannot be a value of Euler’s function ϕ(n). If the class {νo}1 is
empty (for example, in the case ϕ∗−1(3) or ϕ∗−1(5)), then we get the equiva-
lence class Xp+1. Conversely, if {νo}1 isn’t empty, then we obtain the range of
values ϕ−1(νo − 1) for any νo in the class {νo}1. Here we have two subcases.
2. (a) Either {νo}2 = ∅ or (b) {νo}2 6= ∅. In the first case the process of
construction Xp+1 is finished. If {νo}2 6= ∅, then all is repeated. Here we have
also two subcases.
3. (a) Either {νo}3 = ∅ or (b) {νo}3 6= ∅, etc.
...
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Thus, the sequence of finite-valued  Lukasiewicz’s matrix logics M L2+1 ,
M L3+1 , M L5+1 , M L7+1 , . . . corresponds to the sequence of equivalence classes
X2+1, X3+1, X5+1, X7+1, . . . of all finite-valued  Lukasiewicz’s matrix logics
M L2+1 , M L3+1 , M L4+1 , M L5+1 , . . .
3.3 n-valued  Lukasiewicz’s calculi of Hilbert’s
type
Consider the n-ary  Lukasiewicz propositional calculus  Ln of Hilbert’s type.
The axioms of this calculus are as follows:
(p→L q)→L ((q →L r)→L (p→L r)), (3.1)
p→L (q →L p), (3.2)
((p→L q)→L q)→L ((q →L p)→L p), (3.3)
(p→nL q)→L (p→
n−1
L q) (3.4)
for any n > 1; notice that p→0L q = q and p→
k+1
L q = p→L (p→
k
L q),
(p ∧ q)→L p, (3.5)
(p ∧ q)→L q, (3.6)
(p→L q)→L ((p→L r)→L (p→L (q ∧ r))), (3.7)
p→L (p ∨ q), (3.8)
q →L (p ∨ q), (3.9)
((p→L r)→L ((q →L r)→L (p ∨ q)→L r)), (3.10)
(¬Lp→L ¬Lq)→L (q →L p), (3.11)
(p↔ (p→s−1L ¬Lp))→
n−1
L p (3.12)
for any 1 6 s 6 n − 1 such that n − 1 doesn’t divide by s and we have
p↔ q = (p→L q) ∧ (q →L p).
There are two inference rules in the system  Ln: modus ponens and substi-
tution rule. This formalization of  Ln was created by Tuziak in [146].
Let us show by means of the truth table that the formula (p →2L q) →L
(p→L q) isn’t tautology in 3-valued  Lukasiewicz’s logic.
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p q p→L q p→L (p→L q) (p→L (p→L q))→L (p→L q)
2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 2
2 0 0 0 2
1 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 2
1 0 1 2 1
0 2 2 2 2
0 1 2 2 2
0 0 2 2 2
But the formula (p→3L q)→L (p→
2
L q) is a tautology:
p q p →L q p →L (p →L q) p →L (p →L (p →L q)) (p →
3
L
q) →L (p →
2
L
q)
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 2
2 0 0 0 0 2
1 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 2 2
1 0 1 2 2 2
0 2 2 2 2 2
0 1 2 2 2 2
0 0 2 2 2 2
We already know that the formula (p →kL q) →L (p →
k−1
L q) is tautology
for any k > n in n-valued  Lukasiewicz’s logic. Thus, some tautologies of
the classical logic are ignored in finite-valued  Lukasiewicz’s logic as well as
the other tautologies of the classical logic are ignored in the other nonclassical
logics.
3.4 Sequent calculi for n-valued  Lukasiewicz’s
logics
Sequent calculi and natural deduction systems for n-valued logic  Ln, where n
is a finite natural number, are considered by Baaz, Fermu¨ller, and Zach
in [14], [15], [16]. An n-valued sequent is regarded as an n-tuple of finite sets
Γi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) of formulas, denoted by Γ1 | Γ2 | . . . | Γn. It is defined to be
satisfied by an interpretation iff for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} at least one formula in
Γi takes the truth value i− 1 ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, where {0, . . . , n− 1} is the set of
truth values for  Ln.
By this approach, a two-valued sequent with Gentzen’s standard notation
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, where Γ1 and Γ2 are finite sequences of formulas, is interpreted truth-
functionally: either one of the formulas in Γ1 is false or one of the formulas in
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Γ2 is true. In other words, we can denote a sequent Γ1 →֒ Γ2 by Γ1 | Γ2 and we
can define it to be satisfied by an interpretation iff for some i ∈ {1, 2} at least
one formula in Γi takes the truth value i− 1 ∈ {0, 1}.
Let I be an interpretation. The I p-satisfies (n-satisfies) a sequent Γ1 |
Γ2 | . . . | Γn iff there is an i (1 6 i 6 n) such that, for some formula ϕ ∈ Γi,
valI(ϕ) = i−1 ∈ Vn (valI(ϕ) 6= i−1 ∈ Vn). This I is called a p-model (n-model)
of Γ, i.e. I |=p Γ (I |=n Γ). A sequent is called p- (n)-valid , if it is p- (n)-satisfied
by every interpretation.
Also, a sequent Γ is called p-satisfiable (n-satisfiable) iff there is an inter-
pretation I such that I |=p Γ (I |=n Γ), and p-valid (n-valid) iff for every
interpretation I, I |=p Γ (I |=n Γ). The concept of p-satisfiability was proposed
by Rousseau in [119].
Notice that according to p-satisfiability a sequent is understood as a positive
disjunction and according to n-satisfiability as a negative disjunction. There-
fore the negation of a p-sequent (n-sequent) is equivalent to a conjunction of
n-sequents (p-sequents).
By [i : ψ] denote a sequent in that a formula ψ occurs at place i+ 1.
Consider the sequent containing only one formula i : ψ with the truth value
i. Then we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 A sequent [i : ψ] is p-unsatisfiable (n-unsatisfiable) iff it is n-
valid (p-valid).
Proof. The negation of the p-sequent ψi is the n-sequent ¬ψi.
On the other hand, the n-sequent ¬ψi can also be written as a p-sequent∨
j 6=i ψ
j , and hence the p-unsatisfiability of [i : ψ] can be established by proving
[V \{i} : ψ] p-valid. ✷
Proposition 4 Let ψ be a formula. Then the following are equivalent:
• ψ is a tautology.
• The sequent [V+ : ψ] is p-valid
• The sequents [j : ψ], where j ∈ V \V+, are all n-valid. ✷
Proposition 5 Let ψ be a formula. Then the following are equivalent:
• ψ is a unsatisfiable.
• The sequent [V \V+ : ψ] is p-valid.
• The sequents [j : ψ], where j ∈ V+, are all n-valid. ✷
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Definition 8 An introduction rule for a connective  at place i in the n-valued
 Lukasiewicz’s logic  Ln is a schema of the form:
〈Γj1,∆
j
1 | . . . | Γ
j
n,∆
j
n〉j∈N
Γ1 | . . . | Γi,(ψ1, . . . , ψm) | . . . | Γn
 : i
where the arity of  is m, N is a finite set, Γl =
⋃
j∈N Γ
j
l , ∆
j
l ⊆ {ψ1, . . . , ψm},
and for every interpretation I the following are equivalent:
1. (ψ1, . . . , ψn) takes (resp. does not take) the truth value i− 1.
2. For all j ∈ N , an interpretation I p- (resp. n)-satisfies the sequents ∆j1 |
. . . | ∆jn.
Note that these introduction rules are generated in a mechanical way from
the truth table ˜i: V (M Ln)
i → V (M Ln) of the connective 
i through con-
junctive normal forms (see proposition 2).
Definition 9 An introduction rule for a quantifier Q at place i in the n-valued
 Lukasiewicz’s logic  Ln is a schema of the form:
〈Γj1,∆
j
1 | . . . | Γ
j
n,∆
j
n〉j∈N
Γ1 | . . . | Γi,Qx ψ(x) | . . . | Γn
Q : i
where
• N is a finite set,
• Γl =
⋃
j∈N Γ
j
l , ∆
j
l ⊆ {ψ(a1), . . . , ψ(ap)} ∪ {ψ(t1), . . . , ψ(tq)},
• the al are free variables satisfying the condition that they do not occur in
the lower sequent,
• the tk are arbitrary terms,
and for every interpretation I the following are equivalent:
1. Qx ψ(x) takes (does not take) the truth value i− 1 under I.
2. For all d1, . . . , dp ∈ D, there are e1, . . . , eq ∈ D such that for all j ∈ N ,
an interpretation I p- (n)-satisfies ∆′j1 | . . . | ∆
′j
n where ∆
′j
l is obtained
from ∆jl by instantiating the eigenvariable ak (term variable tk) with dk
(ek).
A p-sequent calculus for a logic  Ln is given by:
• Axioms of the form: ϕ | ϕ | . . . | ϕ, where ϕ is any formula.
• For every connective  of the logic  Ln and every truth value i − 1 an
appropriate introduction rule  : i.
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• For every quantifier Q and every truth value i − 1 an appropriate intro-
duction rule Q : i.
• Weakening rules for every place i:
Γ1 | . . . | Γi | . . . | Γn
Γ1 | . . . | Γi, ψ | . . . | Γn
w : i
• Cut rules for every pair of truth values (i− 1, j − 1) such that i 6= j:
Γ1 | . . . | Γi, ψ | . . . | Γn ∆1 | . . . | ∆j , ψ | . . . | ∆n
Γ1,∆1 | . . . | Γn,∆n
cut : ij
An n-sequent calculus for a logic  Ln is given by:
• Axioms of the form: ∆1 | . . . | ∆n, where ∆i = ∆j = {ψ} for some i, j
such that i 6= j and ∆k = ∅ otherwise (ψ is any formula).
• For every connective  and every truth value i − 1 an appropriate intro-
duction rule  : i.
• For every quantifier Q and every truth value i − 1 an appropriate intro-
duction rule Q : i.
• Weakening rules identical to the ones of p-sequent calculi.
• The cut rule:
〈Γj1 | . . . | Γ
j
i | . . .Γ
j
n,∆
j
n〉
n
j=1
Γ1 | . . . | Γn
cut :
where Γl =
⋃
16j6n Γ
j
l .
A sequent is p- (n)-provable if there is an upward tree of sequents such that
every topmost sequent is an axiom and every other sequent is obtained from the
ones standing immediately above it by an application of one of the rules of p-
(n)-sequent calculus.
Theorem 3 (Soundness and Completeness) For every p- (n)-sequent cal-
culus the following holds: A sequent is p- (n)-provable without cut rule(s) iff it
is p- (n)-valid.
Proof. See [16].
Example: 3-valued  Lukasiewicz’s propositional logic. Let us con-
sider here the 3-valued  Lukasiewicz logic with the set of basic connectives
{→L,¬L}. Recall that the 3 values are denoted by {0, 1, 2}.
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1. Introduction rules for ¬L in p-sequent calculus:
Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3, ψ
Γ1,¬Lψ | Γ2 | Γ3
¬L : 0
Γ1 | Γ2, ψ | Γ3
Γ1 | Γ2,¬Lψ | Γ3
¬L : 1
Γ1, ψ | Γ2 | Γ3
Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3,¬Lψ
¬L : 2
2. Introduction rules for →L in p-sequent calculus:
Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3, ψ Γ1, ϕ | Γ2 | Γ3
Γ1, ψ →L ϕ | Γ2 | Γ3
→L: 0
Γ1 | Γ2, ψ | Γ3, ψ Γ1 | Γ2, ψ, ϕ | Γ3 Γ1, ϕ | Γ2 | Γ3, ψ
Γ1 | Γ2, ψ →L ϕ | Γ3
→L: 1
Γ1, ψ | Γ2, ϕ | Γ3, ϕ Γ1, ψ | Γ2, ψ | Γ3, ϕ
Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3, ψ →L ϕ
→L: 2
3.5 Hypersequent calculus for 3-valued  Lukasie-
wicz’s propositional logic
The hypersequent formalization of 3-valued  Lukasiewicz’s propositional logic
 L3 was proposed by Avron in [5]. Let us remember what is a hypersequent.
Definition 10 A hypersequent is a structure of the form:
Γ →֒ ∆ | Γ′ →֒ ∆′ | . . . | Γ′′ →֒ ∆′′,
where Γ →֒ ∆, Γ′ →֒ ∆′,. . ., Γ′′ →֒ ∆′′ are finite sequences of ordinary sequents
in Gentzen’s sense.
We shall use G and H as variables for possibly empty hypersequents.
The standard interpretation of the | symbol is usually disjunctive, i.e. a hy-
persequent is true if and only if one of its components is true.
The only axiom of this calculus: ψ →֒ ψ.
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The inference rules are as follows.
G|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ →֒ ∆|Γ′ →֒ ∆′
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ′ →֒ ∆′|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ →֒ ∆|Γ′ →֒ ∆′
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆|H
G|ψ,Γ →֒ ∆|H
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆|H
G|Γ →֒ ∆, ψ|H
,
G|ψ, ϕ,Γ →֒ ∆|H
G|ϕ, ψ,Γ →֒ ∆|H
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆, ψ, ϕ|H
G|Γ →֒ ∆, ϕ, ψ|H
,
G|ψ, ϕ,Γ →֒ ∆|H
G|ψ ∧ ϕ,Γ →֒ ∆|H
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆, ψ, ϕ|H
G|Γ →֒ ∆, ψ ∨ ϕ|H
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆, ψ|H G|Γ →֒ ∆, ϕ|H
G|Γ →֒ ∆, ψ ∧ ϕ|H
,
G|ψ,Γ →֒ ∆|H G|ϕ,Γ →֒ ∆|H
G|ψ ∨ ϕ,Γ →֒ ∆|H
,
G|ψ,Γ →֒ ∆, ϕ
G|Γ →֒ ∆, ψ →L ϕ
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆, ψ G|ϕ,Γ →֒ ∆
G|ψ →L ϕ,Γ →֒ ∆
,
G|ψ,Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ →֒ ∆,¬Lψ
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆, ψ
G|¬Lψ,Γ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 →֒ ∆1,∆2,∆3|H G|Γ′1,Γ
′
2,Γ
′
3 →֒ ∆
′
1,∆
′
2,∆
′
3|H
G|Γ1,Γ′1 →֒ ∆1,∆
′
1|Γ2,Γ
′
2 →֒ ∆2,∆
′
2|Γ3,Γ
′
3 →֒ ∆3,∆
′
3|H
.
Chapter 4
Infinite valued
 Lukasiewicz’s logics
4.1 Preliminaries
The ordered system 〈VQ, ¬L, →L, &L, ∨, ∧, ∃˜, ∀˜, {1}〉 is called rational valued
 Lukasiewicz’s matrix logic MQ, where
1. VQ = {x : x ∈ Q} ∩ [0, 1],
2. for all x ∈ VQ, ¬Lx = 1− x,
3. for all x, y ∈ VQ, x→L y = min(1, 1− x+ y),
4. for all x, y ∈ VQ, x&Ly = ¬L(x→L ¬Ly),
5. for all x, y ∈ VQ, x ∨ y = (x→L y)→L y = max(x, y),
6. for all x, y ∈ VQ, x ∧ y = ¬L(¬Lx ∨ ¬Ly) = min(x, y),
7. for a subset M ⊆ VQ, ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
8. for a subset M ⊆ VQ, ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
9. {1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value 0 ∈ VQ is false, the truth value 1 ∈ VQ is true, and other
truth values x ∈ VQ\{0, 1} are neutral.
Real valued  Lukasiewicz’s matrix logic MR is the ordered system 〈VR, ¬L,
→L, &L, ∨, ∧, ∃˜, ∀˜, {1}〉, where
1. VR = {x : x ∈ R} ∩ [0, 1],
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2. for all x ∈ VR, ¬Lx = 1− x,
3. for all x, y ∈ VR, x→L y = min(1, 1− x+ y),
4. for all x, y ∈ VR, x&Ly = ¬L(x→L ¬Ly),
5. for all x, y ∈ VR, x ∨ y = (x→L y)→L y = max(x, y),
6. for all x, y ∈ VR, x ∧ y = ¬L(¬Lx ∨ ¬Ly) = min(x, y),
7. for a subset M ⊆ VR, ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
8. for a subset M ⊆ VR, ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
9. {1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value 0 ∈ VR is false, the truth value 1 ∈ VR is true, and other
truth values x ∈ VR\{0, 1} are neutral.
The logics MQ and MR will be denoted by M[0,1]. They are called infinite
valued  Lukasiewicz’s matrix logic.
4.2 Hilbert’s type calculus for infinite valued  Lu-
kasiewicz’s logic
 Lukasiewicz’s infinite valued logic is denoted by  L∞. The basic operations
of  L∞ are ⊥ (truth constant ‘falsehood’) and  Lukasiewicz’s implications →L.
Other connectives are derivable:
¬Lψ =: ψ →L ⊥,
ψ&Lϕ =: ¬L(ψ →L ¬Lϕ),
ψ ∧ ϕ =: ψ&L(ψ →L ϕ),
ψ ∨ ϕ =: (ψ →L ϕ)→L ϕ,
⊤ =: ¬L⊥.
The Hilbert’s type calculus for  L∞ consists of the axioms:
ψ →L (ϕ→L ψ), (4.1)
(ψ →L ϕ)→L ((ϕ→L χ)→L (ψ →L χ)), (4.2)
((ψ →L ϕ)→L ϕ)→L ((ϕ→L ψ)→L ψ), (4.3)
(¬Lψ →L ¬Lϕ)→L (ϕ→L ψ), (4.4)
∀x ϕ(x)→L ϕ[x/t], (4.5)
41
ϕ[x/t]→L ∃x ϕ(x), (4.6)
where the formula ϕ[x/t] is the result of substituting the term t for all free
occurrences of x in ϕ,
∀x(χ→L ϕ)→L (χ→L ∀xϕ), (4.7)
∀x(ϕ→L χ)→L (∃xϕ→L χ), (4.8)
∀x(χ ∨ ϕ)→L (χ ∨ ∀xϕ), (4.9)
where x is not free in χ.
In  L∞ there are the following inference rules:
1. Modus ponens : from ϕ and ϕ→L ψ infer ψ:
ϕ, ϕ→L ψ
ψ
.
2. Substitution rule: we can substitute any formulas for propositional vari-
ables.
3. Generalization: from ϕ infer ∀xϕ(x):
ϕ
∀x ϕ(x)
.
The Hilbert’s type propositional calculus for  L∞ can be obtained by ex-
tending the axiom system (10.1) – (10.8) by the expression (4.3).
4.3 Sequent calculus for infinite valued  Luka-
siewicz’s propositional logic
An original interpretation of a sequent for infinite valued  Lukasiewicz’s logic
 L∞ was proposed by Metcalfe, Olivetti, and Gabbay in [96]. For setting
this interpretation they used the following proposition:
Proposition 6 LetM[−1,0] be the structure 〈[−1, 0],max,min,&L,→L, 0〉 where
• &L =: max(−1, x+ y) and
• x→L y =: min(0, y − x),
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• 0 is the designated truth value,
then ψ is logically valid in M[−1,0] iff ψ is logically valid in  Lukasiewicz’s
matrix logic M[0,1].
Proof. See [96]. ✷
Definition 11 A sequent written Γ1 →֒ Γ2, where Γ1 = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} and
Γ2 = {ψ1, . . . , ψn}, has the following interpretation: Γ1 →֒ Γ2 is logically valid
in  L∞ iff (ψ1 + . . . + ψn) →L (ϕ1 + . . . + ϕm) is logically valid in  L∞ for
all valuations valI mapped from formulas of L to the structure M[−1,0], where
χ1 + . . .+ χk = ⊤ if k = 0.
1. Axioms of the sequent calculus:
(ID) ψ →֒ ψ, (Λ) →֒ , (⊥) ⊥ →֒ ψ.
2. Structural rules:
Γ →֒ ∆
Γ, ψ →֒ ∆
,
Γ1 →֒ ∆1 Γ2 →֒ ∆2
Γ1,Γ2 →֒ ∆1,∆2
,
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ →֒
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆,∆, . . . ,∆
Γ →֒ ∆
, n > 0.
3. Logical rules:
Γ, ϕ, ϕ→L ψ →֒ ∆, ψ
Γ, ψ →L ϕ →֒ ∆
,
Γ →֒ ∆ Γ, ψ →֒ ϕ,∆
Γ →֒ ψ →L ϕ,∆
,
Γ, ψ, ϕ →֒ ∆ Γ,⊥ →֒ ∆
Γ, ψ&Lϕ →֒ ∆
,
Γ, (ψ →L ⊥)→L ϕ →֒ ψ, ϕ,∆
Γ →֒ ψ&Lϕ,∆
.
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4.4 Hypersequent calculus for infinite valued  Lu-
kasiewicz’s propositional logic
The concept of hypersequent calculi was introduced for non-classical logics by
Avron in [8]. Hypersequents consist of multiple sequents interpreted disjunc-
tively. Therefore hypersequent rules include, in addition to single sequent rules,
external structural rules that can operate on more than one component at a time.
Definition 12 A hypersequent is a multiset of components written
Γ1 →֒ ∆1| . . . |Γn →֒ ∆n
with the following interpretation: Γ1 →֒ ∆1| . . . |Γn →֒ ∆n is logically valid in
 Lukasiewicz’s logic  L∞ iff for all valuations valI mapped from formulas of L
to the structure M[−1,0] there exists i such that
∑
ψ∈Γi
valI(ψ) 6
∑
ϕ∈∆i
valI(ϕ).
1. The axioms, i.e. the initial sequents, are as follows:
(ID) ψ →֒ ψ, (Λ) →֒, (⊥) ⊥ →֒ ψ.
2. Let G be a variable for possibly empty hypersequents. The structural
rules:
G|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ, ψ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ →֒ ∆|Γ′ →֒ ∆′
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ1,Γ2 →֒ ∆1,∆2
G|Γ1 →֒ ∆2|Γ2 →֒ ∆2
,
G|Γ1 →֒ ∆1 G|Γ2 →֒ ∆2
G|Γ1,Γ2 →֒ ∆1,∆2
.
3. Logical rules:
G|Γ, ϕ →֒ ψ,∆
G|Γ, ψ →L ϕ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆ G|Γ, ψ →֒ ϕ,∆
G|Γ →֒ ψ →L ϕ,∆
,
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G|Γ, ψ, ϕ →֒ ∆ G|Γ,⊥ →֒ ∆
G|Γ, ψ&Lϕ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ →֒ ψ, ϕ,∆|Γ →֒ ⊥,∆
G|Γ →֒ ψ&Lϕ,∆
.
As an example, consider the proof of (4.3) using just sequents:
1.
ϕ →֒ ϕ ψ →֒ ψ ϕ →֒ ϕ ψ →֒ ψ
ϕ, ψ →֒ ψ, ϕ ϕ, ψ →֒ ψ, ϕ
,
2.
ϕ, ψ →֒ ψ, ϕ ϕ, ψ →֒ ψ, ϕ
ϕ, ϕ→L ψ →֒ ψ ϕ, ϕ→L ψ, ψ →֒ ψ, ϕ
,
3.
ϕ, ϕ→L ψ →֒ ψ ϕ, ϕ→L ψ, ψ →֒ ψ, ϕ
ϕ, ϕ→L ψ →֒ ψ, ψ →L ϕ
,
4.
ϕ, ϕ→L ψ →֒ ψ, ψ →L ϕ
(ψ →L ϕ)→L ϕ, ϕ→L ψ →֒ ψ
,
5.
(ψ →L ϕ)→L ϕ, ϕ→L ψ →֒ ψ
(ψ →L ϕ)→L ϕ →֒ (ϕ→L ψ)→L ψ
,
6.
(ψ →L ϕ)→L ϕ →֒ (ϕ→L ψ)→L ψ
→֒ ((ψ →L ϕ)→L ϕ)→L ((ϕ→L ψ)→L ψ)
.
However there exist some tautologies that can be proved only by means of
hypersequents in the framework of this calculus (see [96]).
Chapter 5
Go¨del’s logic
5.1 Preliminaries
Go¨del’s matrix logic G[0,1] is interesting as the logic of linear order. It is the
structure 〈[0, 1], ¬G, →G, ∨, ∧, ∃˜, ∀˜, {1}〉, where
1. for all x ∈ [0, 1], ¬Gx = x→G 0,
2. for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], x→G y = 1 if x 6 y and x→G y = y otherwise,
3. for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], x ∨ y = max(x, y),
4. for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], x ∧ y = min(x, y),
5. for a subset M ⊆ [0, 1], ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
6. for a subset M ⊆ [0, 1], ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
7. {1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value 0 ∈ [0, 1] is false, the truth value 1 ∈ [0, 1] is true, and other
truth values x ∈ (0, 1) are neutral.
5.2 Hilbert’s type calculus for Go¨del’s logic
Go¨del’s logic denoted by G is one of the main intermediate between intuition-
istic and classical logics. It can be obtained by adding (ψ →G ϕ) ∨ (ϕ →G ψ)
to any axiomatization of intuitionistic logic (about intuitionism see [70], [87]).
The Go¨del logic was studied by Dummett in [42].
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The negation of G is understood as follows
¬Gψ =: ψ →G ⊥,
where ⊥ is the truth constant ‘falsehood’.
As an example, the Hilbert’s type calculus for G consists of the following
axioms:
(ψ →G ϕ)→G ((ϕ→G χ)→G (ψ →G χ)), (5.1)
ψ →G (ψ ∨ ϕ), (5.2)
ϕ→G (ψ ∨ ϕ), (5.3)
(ϕ→G χ)→G ((ψ →G χ)→G ((ϕ ∨ ψ)→G χ)), (5.4)
(ϕ ∧ ψ)→G ϕ, (5.5)
(ϕ ∧ ψ)→G ψ, (5.6)
(χ→G ϕ)→G ((χ→G ψ)→G (χ→G (ϕ ∧ ψ))), (5.7)
(ϕ→G (ψ →G χ))→G ((ϕ ∧ ψ)→G χ), (5.8)
((ϕ ∧ ψ)→G χ)→G (ϕ→G (ψ →G χ)), (5.9)
(ϕ ∧ ¬Gϕ)→G ψ, (5.10)
(ϕ→G (ϕ ∧ ¬Gϕ))→G ¬Gϕ, (5.11)
(ψ →G ϕ) ∨ (ϕ→G ψ), (5.12)
∀x ϕ(x)→G ϕ[x/t], (5.13)
ϕ[x/t]→G ∃x ϕ(x), (5.14)
where the formula ϕ[x/t] is the result of substituting the term t for all free
occurrences of x in ϕ,
∀x(χ→G ϕ)→G (χ→G ∀xϕ), (5.15)
∀x(ϕ→G χ)→G (∃xϕ→G χ), (5.16)
∀x(χ ∨ ϕ)→G (χ ∨ ∀xϕ), (5.17)
where x is not free in χ.
In G there are the following inference rules:
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1. Modus ponens : from ϕ and ϕ→G ψ infer ψ:
ϕ, ϕ→G ψ
ψ
.
2. Substitution rule: we can substitute any formulas for propositional vari-
ables.
3. Generalization: from ϕ infer ∀xϕ(x):
ϕ
∀x ϕ(x)
.
The Hilbert’s type propositional calculus for Go¨del’s logic G can be ob-
tained by extending the axiom system (10.1) – (10.8) by the following axiom:
ψ →G (ψ ∧ ψ).
5.3 Sequent calculus for Go¨del’s propositional
logic
A sequent forGo¨del’s logicG is understood in the standard way, i.e. as follows:
Γ1 →֒ Γ2, where Γ1 = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕj}, Γ2 = {ψ1, . . . , ψi}, is logically valid in G iff∧
j
ϕj →G
∨
i
ψi
is logically valid in G.
1. The initial sequents in G:
(ID) ψ →֒ ψ, (⊥ →֒) Γ,⊥ →֒ ∆, (→֒ ⊥) Γ →֒ ⊥.
2. The structural rules are as follows:
Γ →֒ ∆
Γ, ψ →֒ ∆
,
Γ, ψ, ψ →֒ ∆
Γ, ψ →֒ ∆
,
Γ1, ψ →֒ ∆ Γ2 →֒ ψ
Γ1,Γ2 →֒ ∆
,
Γ →֒
Γ →֒ ψ
.
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3. Logical rules:
Γ, ϕ →֒ ψ
Γ →֒ ϕ→G ψ
,
Γ1 →֒ ψ Γ2, ϕ →֒ ∆
Γ1,Γ2, ψ →G ϕ →֒ ∆
,
Γ1, ψ →֒ Γ2
Γ1, ψ ∧ χ →֒ Γ2
,
Γ1, χ →֒ Γ2
Γ1, ψ ∧ χ →֒ Γ2
,
Γ1, ψ →֒ Γ2 Γ1, χ →֒ Γ2
Γ1, ψ ∨ χ →֒ Γ2
,
Γ →֒ ψ Γ →֒ χ
Γ →֒ ψ ∧ χ
,
Γ1 →֒ ψ
Γ1 →֒ ψ ∨ χ
,
Γ1 →֒ χ
Γ1 →֒ ψ ∨ χ
.
5.4 Hypersequent calculus for Go¨del’s proposi-
tional logic
A hypersequent in G is interpreted in the standard way, i.e., disjunctively.
1. The initial sequents in G are as follows:
(ID) ψ →֒ ψ, (⊥ →֒) Γ,⊥ →֒ ∆, (→֒ ⊥) Γ →֒ ⊥.
2. Let G be a variable for possibly empty hypersequents. The structural
rules:
G|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ, ψ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ, ψ, ψ →֒ ∆
G|Γ, ψ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ →֒ ∆|Γ′ →֒ ∆′
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ1,Π2 →֒ ∆1 G|Γ2,Π2 →֒ ∆2
G|Γ1,Γ2 →֒ ∆1|Π1,Π2 →֒ ∆2
,
G|Γ →֒
G|Γ →֒ ψ
.
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3. Logical rules:
G|Γ, ϕ →֒ ψ
G|Γ →֒ ϕ→G ψ
,
G|Γ1 →֒ ψ G|Γ2, ϕ →֒ ∆
G|Γ1,Γ2, ψ →G ϕ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ1, ψ →֒ Γ2
G|Γ1, ψ ∧ χ →֒ Γ2
,
G|Γ1, χ →֒ Γ2
G|Γ1, ψ ∧ χ →֒ Γ2
,
G|Γ1, ψ →֒ Γ2 G|Γ1, χ →֒ Γ2
G|Γ1, ψ ∨ χ →֒ Γ2
,
G|Γ →֒ ψ G|Γ →֒ χ
G|Γ →֒ ψ ∧ χ
,
G|Γ1 →֒ ψ
G|Γ1 →֒ ψ ∨ χ
,
G|Γ1 →֒ χ
G|Γ1 →֒ ψ ∨ χ
.
4. Cut rule:
G|Γ1, ψ →֒ ∆ G|Γ2 →֒ ψ
G|Γ1,Γ2 →֒ ∆
.
50
Chapter 6
Product logic
6.1 Preliminaries
Product matrix logic Π[0,1] behaves like  L∞ on the interval (0, 1] and like G at
0. It is the structure 〈[0, 1], ¬Π, →Π, &Π, ∧, ∨, ∃˜, ∀˜, {1}〉, where
1. for all x ∈ [0, 1], ¬Πx = x→Π 0,
2. for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], x→Π y =
{
y
x
, if x > y;
1, otherwise,
3. for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], x&Πy = x · y,
4. for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], x ∧ y = x · (x→Π y),
5. for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], x ∨ y = ((x→Π y)→Π y) ∧ ((y →Π x)→Π x),
6. for a subset M ⊆ [0, 1], ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ [0, 1], ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
8. {1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value 0 ∈ [0, 1] is false, the truth value 1 ∈ [0, 1] is true, and other
truth values x ∈ (0, 1) are neutral.
6.2 Hilbert’s type calculus for Product logic
In the Product logic denoted by Π there are the following abridged notations:
¬Πψ =: ψ →Π ⊥,
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where ⊥ is the truth constant ‘falsehood’,
ϕ ∧ ψ =: ϕ&Π(ϕ→Π ψ),
ϕ ∨ ψ =: ((ϕ→Π ψ)→Π ψ) ∧ ((ψ →Π ϕ)→Π ϕ).
TheHilbert’s type calculus for the Product logicΠ consists of the following
axioms:
(ϕ→Π ψ)→Π ((ψ →Π χ)→Π (ϕ→Π χ)), (6.1)
(ϕ&Πψ)→Π ϕ, (6.2)
(ϕ&Πψ)→Π (ψ&Πϕ), (6.3)
(ϕ&Π(ϕ→Π ψ))→Π (ψ&Π(ψ →Π ϕ)), (6.4)
(ϕ→Π (ψ →Π χ))→Π ((ϕ&Πψ)→Π χ), (6.5)
((ϕ&Πψ)→Π χ)→Π (ϕ→Π (ψ →Π χ)), (6.6)
((ϕ→Π ψ)→Π χ)→Π (((ψ →Π ϕ)→Π χ)→Π χ), (6.7)
⊥ →Π ψ, (6.8)
¬Π¬Πχ→Π (((ϕ&Πχ)→Π (ψ&Πχ))→Π (ϕ→Π ψ)), (6.9)
(ϕ ∧ ¬Πϕ)→Π ⊥, (6.10)
∀x ϕ(x)→Π ϕ[x/t], (6.11)
ϕ[x/t]→Π ∃x ϕ(x), (6.12)
where the formula ϕ[x/t] is the result of substituting the term t for all free
occurrences of x in ϕ,
∀x(χ→Π ϕ)→Π (χ→Π ∀xϕ), (6.13)
∀x(ϕ→Π χ)→Π (∃xϕ→Π χ), (6.14)
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∀x(χ ∨ ϕ)→Π (χ ∨ ∀xϕ), (6.15)
where x is not free in χ.
In Π there are the following inference rules:
1. Modus ponens : from ϕ and ϕ→Π ψ infer ψ:
ϕ, ϕ→Π ψ
ψ
.
2. Substitution rule: we can substitute any formulas for propositional vari-
ables.
3. Generalization: from ϕ infer ∀xϕ(x):
ϕ
∀x ϕ(x)
.
We see that the Hilbert’s type propositional calculus for Product logic is
obtained by extending the axiom system (10.1) – (10.8) by the new axioms (6.9),
(6.10).
6.3 Sequent calculus for Product propositional
logic
A sequent for the Product logic Π is interpreted as follows: Γ1 →֒ Γ2, where
Γ1 = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕj}, Γ2 = {ψ1, . . . , ψi}, is logically valid in Π iff
&Πjϕj →Π &Πiψi
is logically valid in Π, i.e. for all valuations valI in Π[0,1] we have
∏
j
valI(ϕj) 6∏
i
valI(ψi).
1. The initial sequents in Π:
(ID) ψ →֒ ψ, (⊥ →֒) Γ,⊥ →֒ ∆, (Λ) →֒ .
2. The structural rules are as follows:
Γ →֒ ∆
Γ, ψ →֒ ∆
,
Γ1 →֒ ∆1 Γ2 →֒ ∆2
Γ1,Γ2 →֒ ∆1,∆2
,
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n︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ →֒
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆,∆, . . . ,∆
Γ →֒ ∆
, n > 0.
3. Logical rules:
Γ →֒ ψ
Γ¬Πψ →֒ Γ2
,
Γ1 →֒ Γ2 Γ1, ψ →֒ ϕ,Γ2
Γ1 →֒ ψ →Π ϕ,Γ2
,
Γ1, ψ, ϕ →֒ Γ2
Γ1, ψ&Πϕ →֒ Γ2
,
Γ1 →֒ ψ, ϕ,Γ2
Γ1 →֒ ψ&Πϕ,Γ2
,
Γ1,¬Πψ →֒ Γ2 Γ1, ϕ, ϕ→Π ψ →֒ ψ,Γ2
Γ1, ψ →Π ϕ →֒ Γ2
.
6.4 Hypersequent calculus for Product proposi-
tional logic
A hypersequent in Π is interpreted in the standard way, i.e., disjunctively.
1. The initial sequents in Π:
(ID) ψ →֒ ψ, (⊥ →֒) Γ,⊥ →֒ ∆, (Λ) →֒ .
2. Let G be a variable for possibly empty hypersequents. The structural
rules:
G|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ, ψ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ →֒ ∆|Γ′ →֒ ∆′
,
G|Γ →֒ ∆|Γ →֒ ∆
G|Γ →֒ ∆
,
G|Γ1,Γ2 →֒ ∆1,∆2
G|Γ1 →֒ ∆2|Γ2 →֒ ∆2
,
G|Γ1 →֒ ∆1 G|Γ2 →֒ ∆2
G|Γ1,Γ2 →֒ ∆1,∆2
.
3. Logical rules:
G|Γ →֒ ψ
G|Γ¬Πψ →֒ Γ2
,
G|Γ1 →֒ Γ2 G|Γ1, ψ →֒ ϕ,Γ2
G|Γ1 →֒ ψ →Π ϕ,Γ2
,
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G|Γ1, ψ, ϕ →֒ Γ2
G|Γ1, ψ&Πϕ →֒ Γ2
,
G|Γ1 →֒ ψ, ϕ,Γ2
G|Γ1 →֒ ψ&Πϕ,Γ2
,
G|Γ1,¬Πψ →֒ Γ2 G|Γ1, ϕ →֒ ψ,Γ2
G|Γ1, ψ →Π ϕ →֒ Γ2
.
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Chapter 7
Nonlinear many valued
logics
 Lukasiewicz’s infinite-valued logic  L∞ is linear in the sense that its truth
functions are linear. Go¨del’s infinite-valued logic G is linear too, but its truth
function ¬G is discontinuous at the point 0.
Consider some sequences of nonlinear many-valued logics depending on nat-
ural parameter n. They can be convergent to linear many-valued logics (i.e., to
 L∞ and G) as n→∞. For the first time these logics were regarded by Russian
logician D. Bochvar.
7.1 Hyperbolic logics
Definition 13 A many-valued logic Hn is said to be hyperbolic if the follow-
ing truth operations ¬Hn and →Hn for an appropriate matrix logic MHn are
hyperbola functions.
Let us consider two cases of hyperbolic matrix logic:  Lukasiewicz’s and
Go¨del’s hyperbolic matrix logics for any positive integer n.
The ordered system 〈V[0,1],¬HLn ,→HLn ,∨HLn ,∧HLn , ∃˜, ∀˜, {1}〉 is called  Lu-
kasiewicz’s hyperbolic matrix logic MHLn , where for any positive integer n,
1. V[0,1] = [0, 1],
2. for all x ∈ V[0,1], ¬HLnx = n ·
1−x
1+x ,
3. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x→HLn y =
{
1, if x 6 y;
n · 1−(x−y)
n+(x−y) , if x > y.
,
4. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x ∨HLn y = (x→HLn y)→HLn y,
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5. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x ∧HLn y = ¬HLn(¬HLnx ∨ ¬HLny),
6. for a subset M ⊆ V[0,1], ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ V[0,1], ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
8. {1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value 0 ∈ V[0,1] is false, the truth value 1 ∈ V[0,1] is true, and other
truth values x ∈ V[0,1]\{0, 1} are neutral.
Obviously that if n→∞, then
• ¬HLnx = 1− x,
• x→HLn y = min(1, 1− x+ y),
• x ∨HLn y = max(x, y),
• x ∧HLn y = min(x, y),
in other words, we obtain  Lukasiewicz’s infinite valued logic  L∞.
Some examples of many-valued tautologies for MHLn are as follows:
ψ →HLn ψ,
¬HLn¬HLnψ →HLn ψ,
ψ →HLn ¬HLn¬HLnψ.
The ordered system 〈V[0,1],¬HGn ,→HGn ,∨,∧, ∃˜, ∀˜, {1}〉 is called Go¨del’s
hyperbolic matrix logic MHGn , where for any positive integer n,
1. V[0,1] = [0, 1],
2. for all x ∈ V[0,1], ¬HGnx = (
1−x
1+x )
n,
3. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x→HGn y =
{
1, if x 6 y;
(n+1)·y
n+x , if x > y.
,
4. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x ∨ y = max(x, y),
5. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x ∧ y = min(x, y),
6. for a subset M ⊆ V[0,1], ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ V[0,1], ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
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8. {1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value 0 ∈ V[0,1] is false, the truth value 1 ∈ V[0,1] is true, and other
truth values x ∈ V[0,1]\{0, 1} are neutral.
It is evident that if n→∞, then
• ¬HGnx =
{
1, if x = 0;
0, if x 6= y,
• x→HGn y =
{
1, if x 6 y;
y, if x > y.
,
i.e., we obtain Go¨del’s infinite valued logic G.
7.2 Parabolic logics
Definition 14 A many-valued logic Pn is said to be parabolic if the following
truth operations ¬Pn and→Pn for an appropriate matrix logic MPn are parabola
functions.
The ordered system 〈V[0,1],¬Pn ,→Pn ,∨Pn ,∧Pn , ∃˜, ∀˜, {1}〉 is called parabolic
matrix logic MPn , where for any positive integer n,
1. V[0,1] = [0, 1],
2. for all x ∈ V[0,1], ¬Pnx =
1−x2
n
,
3. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x→Pn y =
{
1, if x2 6 y;
1−x2
n
+ y, if x2 > y.
,
4. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x ∨Pn y = (x→Pn y)→Pn y,
5. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x ∧Pn y = ¬Pn(¬Pnx ∨ ¬Pny),
6. for a subset M ⊆ V[0,1], ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ V[0,1], ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
8. {1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value 0 ∈ V[0,1] is false, the truth value 1 ∈ V[0,1] is true, and other
truth values x ∈ V[0,1]\{0, 1} are neutral.
The ordered system 〈V[0,1],¬Pn ,→Pn ,∨Pn ,∧Pn , ∃˜, ∀˜, {1}〉 is called quasipa-
rabolic matrix logic MPn , where for any positive integer n,
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1. V[0,1] = [0, 1],
2. for all x ∈ V[0,1], ¬Pnx =
1−x2
1+ n
n+1
·x
,
3. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x→Pn y = min(1,
1−x2
1+ n
n+1
·x
+ y),
4. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x ∨Pn y = (x→Pn y)→Pn y,
5. for all x, y ∈ V[0,1], x ∧Pn y = ¬Pn(¬Pnx ∨ ¬Pny),
6. for a subset M ⊆ V[0,1], ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ V[0,1], ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
8. {1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value 0 ∈ V[0,1] is false, the truth value 1 ∈ V[0,1] is true, and other
truth values x ∈ V[0,1]\{0, 1} are neutral.
If n → ∞, then the last matrix logic is transformed into  Lukasiewicz’s
infinite valued logic  L∞. This matrix is parabolic in a true sense just in case
n = 0.
Chapter 8
Non-Archimedean valued
logics
8.1 Standard many-valued logics
Definition 15 Let V be a set of truth values. We will say that its members are
exclusive if the powerset P(V ) is a Boolean algebra.
It can be easily shown that all the elements of truth value sets {0, 1, . . . , n},
[0, 1] for  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Product logics are exclusive: for any
their members x, y we have {x} ∩ {y} = ∅ in P(V ). Therefore  Lukasiewicz’s,
Go¨del’s, and Product logics are based on the premise of existence of Shafer’s
model . In other words, these logics are built on the families of exclusive ele-
ments (see [130], [131]).
However, for a wide class of fusion problems, “the intrinsic nature of hy-
potheses can be only vague and imprecise in such a way that precise refinement
is just impossible to obtain in reality so that the exclusive elements θi cannot be
properly identified and precisely separated” (see [135]). This means that if some
elements θi of a frame Θ have non-empty intersection, then sources of evidence
don’t provide their beliefs with the same absolute interpretation of elements of
the same frame Θ and the conflict between sources arises not only because of
the possible unreliability of sources, but also because of possible different and
relative interpretation of Θ (see [40], [41]).
8.2 Many-valued logics on DSm models
Definition 16 Let V be a set of truth values. We will say that its members
are non-exclusive if the powerset P(V ) is not closed under intersection (conse-
quently, it is not a Boolean algebra).
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A many-valued logic is said to be a many-valued logic on non-exclusive ele-
ments if the elements of its set V of truth values are non-exclusive. These logics
are also said to be a many-valued logic on DSm model (Dezert-Smarandache
model).
Recall that a DSm model (Dezert-Smarandache model) is formed as a
hyper-power set. Let Θ = {θ1, . . . , θn} be a finite set (called frame) of n non-
exclusive elements. The hyper-power set DΘ is defined as the set of all composite
propositions built from elements of Θ with ∩ and ∪ operators such that:
1. ∅, θ1, . . . , θn ∈ DΘ;
2. if A,B ∈ DΘ, then A ∩B ∈ DΘ and A ∪B ∈ DΘ;
3. no other elements belong to DΘ, except those obtained by using rules 1
or 2.
The cardinality of DΘ is majored by 22
n
when the cardinality of Θ equals
n, i.e. |Θ| = n. Since for any given finite set Θ, |DΘ| ≥ |2Θ|, we call DΘ
the hyper-power set of Θ. Also, DΘ constitutes what is called the DSm model
Mf (Θ). However elements θi can be truly exclusive. In such case, the hyper-
power set DΘ reduces naturally to the classical power set 2Θ and this con-
stitutes the most restricted hybrid DSm model, denoted by M0(Θ), coincid-
ing with Shafer’s model. As an example, suppose that Θ = {θ1, θ2} with
DΘ = {∅, θ1 ∩ θ2, θ1, θ2, θ1 ∪ θ2}, where θ1 and θ2 are truly exclusive (i.e.,
Shafer’s model M0 holds), then because θ1 ∩ θ2 =M0 ∅, one gets D
Θ =
{∅, θ1 ∩ θ2 =M0 ∅, θ1, θ2, θ1 ∪ θ2} = {∅, θ1, θ2, θ1 ∪ θ2} = 2
Θ.
Now let us show that every non-Archimedean structure is an infinite DSm
model, but no vice versa. The most easy way of setting non-Archimedean struc-
tures was proposed by Robinson in [117]. Consider a set Θ consisting only of
exclusive members. Let I be any infinite index set. Then we can construct an
indexed family ΘI , i.e., we can obtain the set of all functions: f : I → Θ such
that f(α) ∈ Θ for any α ∈ I.
A filter F on the index set I is a family of sets F ⊂ ℘(I) for which:
1. A ∈ F , A ⊂ B ⇒ B ∈ F ;
2. A1, . . . , An ∈ F ⇒
n⋂
k=1
Ak ∈ F ;
3. ∅ /∈ F .
The set of all complements for finite subsets of I is a filter and it is called
a Frechet filter and it is denoted by U . A maximal filter (ultrafilter) that
contains a Frechet filter is called a Frechet ultrafilter .
63
Let U be a Frechet ultrafilter on I. Define a new relation ∽ on the set ΘI
by
f ∽ g ↔ {α ∈ I : f(α) = g(α)} ∈ U . (8.1)
It is easily proved that the relation ∽ is an equivalence. Notice that formula
(8.1) means that f and g are equivalent iff f and g are equal on an infinite index
subset. For each f ∈ ΘI let [f ] denote the equivalence class of f under ∽. The
ultrapower ΘI/U is then defined to be the set of all equivalence classes [f ] as f
ranges over ΘI :
ΘI/U , {[f ] : f ∈ ΘI}.
Also, Robinson has proved that each non-empty set Θ has an ultrapower
with respect to a Frechet filter/ultrafilter U . This ultrapower ΘI/U is said
to be a proper nonstandard extension of Θ and it is denoted by ∗Θ. Let us
notice that if U is not ultrafilter (it is just the Frechet filter), then ∗Θ is not
well-ordered.
Proposition 7 Let X be a non-empty set. A nonstandard extension of X con-
sists of a mapping that assigns a set ∗A to each A ⊆ Xm for all m ≥ 0, such
that ∗X is non-empty and the following conditions are satisfied for all m,n ≥ 0:
1. The mapping preserves Boolean operations on subsets of Xm: if A ⊆ Xm,
then ∗A ⊆ (∗X)m; if A,B ⊆ Xm, then ∗(A∩B) = (∗A∩ ∗B), ∗(A ∪B) =
(∗A ∪ ∗B), and ∗(A\B) = (∗A)\(∗B).
2. The mapping preserves Cartesian products: if A ⊆ Xm and B ⊆ Xn, then
∗(A×B) = ∗A× ∗B, where A×B ⊆ Xm+n. ✷
This proposition is proved in [74].
Recall that each element of ∗Θ is an equivalence class [f ] as f : I → Θ. There
exist two groups of members of ∗Θ:
1. functions that are constant, e.g., f(α) = m ∈ Θ for infinite index subset
{α ∈ I}. A constant function [f = m] is denoted by ∗m,
2. functions that aren’t constant.
The set of all constant functions of ∗Θ is called standard set and it is denoted
by σΘ. The members of σΘ are called standard . It is readily seen that σΘ and
Θ are isomorphic: σΘ ≃ Θ.
The following proposition can be easily proved:
Proposition 8 For any set Θ such that |Θ| ≥ 2, there exists a proper nonstan-
dard extension ∗Θ for which ∗Θ\σΘ 6= ∅.
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Proof. Let I1 = {α1, α2, . . . , αn, . . .} ⊂ I be an infinite set and let U be a
Frechet filter. Suppose that Θ1 = {m1, . . . ,mn} such that |Θ1| ≥ 1 is the
subset of Θ and there is a mapping:
f(α) =
{
mk if α = αk;
m0 ∈ Θ if α ∈ I\I1
and f(α) 6= mk if α = αk mod (n+ 1), k = 1, . . . , n and α 6= αk.
Show that [f ] ∈ ∗Θ\σΘ. The proof is by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose
there is m ∈ Θ such that m ∈ [f(α)]. Consider the set:
I2 = {α ∈ I : f(α) = m} =

{αk} if m = mk, k = 1, . . . , n;
I\I1 if m = m0.
∅ if m /∈ {m0,m1, . . . ,mn}.
In any case I2 /∈ U , because we have {αk} /∈ U , ∅ /∈ U , I\I1 /∈ U . Thus,
[f ] ∈ ∗Θ\σΘ. ✷
The standard members of ∗Θ are exclusive, because their intersections are
empty. Indeed, the members of Θ were exclusive, therefore the members of
σΘ are exclusive too. However the members of ∗Θ\σΘ are non-exclusive. By
definition, if a member a ∈ ∗Θ is nonstandard, then there exists a standard
member b ∈ ∗Θ such that a ∩ b 6= ∅ (for example, see the proof of proposition
2). We can also prove that there exist non-exclusive members a ∈ ∗Θ, b ∈ ∗Θ
such that a ∩ b 6= ∅.
Proposition 9 There exist two inconstant functions f1, f2 such that the inter-
section of f1, f2 isn’t empty.
Proof. Let f1 : I → Θ and f2 : I → Θ. Suppose that [fi 6= n], ∀n ∈ Θ, i = 1, 2,
i.e., f1, f2 aren’t constant. By proposition 2, these functions are nonstandard
members of ∗Θ. Further consider an indexed family F (α) for all α ∈ I such that
{α ∈ I : fi(α) ∈ F (α)} ∈ U ↔ [fi] ∈ B as i = 1, 2. Consequently it is possible
that, for some αj ∈ I, f1(αj) ∩ f2(αj) = nj and nj ∈ F (αj). ✷
Proposition 10 Define the structure 〈P(∗Θ),∩,∪,¬, ∗Θ〉 as follows
• for any A,B ∈ P(∗Θ), A ∩B = {f(α) : f(α) ∈ A ∧ f(α) ∈ B},
• for any A,B ∈ P(∗Θ), A ∪B = {f(α) : f(α) ∈ A ∨ f(α) ∈ B},
• for any A ∈ P(∗Θ), ¬A = {f(α) : f(α) ∈ ∗Θ\A}.
The structure 〈P(∗Θ),∩,∪,¬, ∗Θ〉 is not a Boolean algebra if |Θ| ≥ 2.
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Proof. The set P(∗Θ) is not closed under intersection. Indeed, some elements
of ∗Θ have a non-empty intersection (see the previous proposition) that doesn’t
belong to P(∗Θ), i.e. they aren’t atoms of P(∗Θ) of the form [f ]. ✷
However, the structure 〈P(σΘ),∩,∪,¬, σΘ〉 is a Boolean algebra. In the
meantime P(σΘ) ⊂ P(∗Θ) if |Θ| ≥ 2.
Thus, non-Archimedean structures are infinite DSm-models, be-
cause these contain non-exclusive members.
In the next sections, we shall consider the following non-Archimedean struc-
tures:
1. the nonstandard extension ∗Q (called the field of hyperrational numbers),
2. the nonstandard extension ∗R (called the field of hyperreal numbers),
3. the nonstandard extension Zp (called the ring of p-adic integers) that we
obtain as follows. Let the set N of natural numbers be the index set and
let Θ = {0, . . . , p− 1}. Then the nonstandard extension ΘN\U = Zp.
Further, we shall set the following logics on non-Archimedean structures:
• hyperrational valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Product logics,
• hyperreal valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Product logics,
• p-adic valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Post’s logics.
Note that these many-valued logics are the particular cases of logics on DSm
models.
Recall that non-Archimedean logical multiple-validities were considered by
Schumann in [122], [123], [124], [125], [128], [129].
8.3 Hyper-valued partial order structure
Assume that ∗Q[0,1] = Q
N
[0,1]/U is a nonstandard extension of the subsetQ[0,1] =
Q ∩ [0, 1] of rational numbers, where U is the Frechet filter that may be no
ultrafilter, and σQ[0,1] ⊂
∗Q[0,1] is the subset of standard members. We can
extend the usual order structure on Q[0,1] to a partial order structure on
∗Q[0,1]:
1. for rational numbers x, y ∈ Q[0,1] we have x ≤ y in Q[0,1] iff [f ] ≤ [g] in
∗Q[0,1], where {α ∈ N : f(α) = x} ∈ U and {α ∈ N : g(α) = y} ∈ U ,
i.e., f and g are constant functions such that [f ] = ∗x and [g] = ∗y,
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2. each positive rational number ∗x ∈ σQ[0,1] is greater than any number
[f ] ∈ ∗Q[0,1]\
σQ[0,1],
i.e., ∗x > [f ] for any positive x ∈ Q[0,1] and [f ] ∈
∗Q[0,1], where [f ] isn’t
constant function.
These conditions have the following informal sense:
1. The sets σQ[0,1] and Q[0,1] have isomorphic order structure.
2. The set ∗Q[0,1] contains actual infinities that are less than any positive
rational number of σQ[0,1].
Define this partial order structure on ∗Q[0,1] as follows:
O∗Q 1. For any hyperrational numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗Q[0,1], we set [f ] ≤ [g] if
{α ∈ N : f(α) ≤ g(α)} ∈ U .
2. For any hyperrational numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗Q[0,1], we set [f ] < [g] if
{α ∈ N : f(α) ≤ g(α)} ∈ U
and [f ] 6= [g], i.e., {α ∈ N : f(α) 6= g(α)} ∈ U .
3. For any hyperrational numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗Q[0,1], we set [f ] = [g] if
f ∈ [g].
This ordering relation is not linear, but partial, because there exist elements
[f ], [g] ∈ ∗Q[0,1], which are incompatible.
Introduce two operations max, min in the partial order structure O∗Q:
1. for all hyperrational numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗Q[0,1], min([f ], [g]) = [f ] if and
only if [f ] ≤ [g] under condition O∗Q,
2. for all hyperrational numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗Q[0,1], max([f ], [g]) = [g] if and
only if [f ] ≤ [g] under condition O∗Q,
3. for all hyperrational numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗Q[0,1], min([f ], [g]) = max([f ], [g]) =
[f ] = [g] if and only if [f ] = [g] under condition O∗Q,
4. for all hyperrational numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗Q[0,1], if [f ], [g] are incompatible
under condition O∗Q, then min([f ], [g]) = [h] iff there exists [h] ∈ ∗Q[0,1]
such that
{α ∈ N : min(f(α), g(α)) = h(α)} ∈ U .
5. for all hyperrational numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗Q[0,1], if [f ], [g] are incompatible
under condition O∗Q, then max([f ], [g]) = [h] iff there exists [h] ∈ ∗Q[0,1]
such that
{α ∈ N : max(f(α), g(α)) = h(α)} ∈ U .
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It is easily seen that conditions 1 – 3 are corollaries of conditions 4, 5.
Note there exist the maximal number ∗1 ∈ ∗Q[0,1] and the minimal number
∗0 ∈ ∗Q[0,1] under condition O∗Q. Therefore, for any [f ] ∈
∗Q[0,1], we have:
max(∗1, [f ]) = ∗1, max(∗0, [f ]) = [f ], min(∗1, [f ]) = [f ] and min(∗0, [f ]) = ∗0.
Let us consider a nonstandard extension ∗R[0,1] = R
N
[0,1]/U for the subset
R[0,1] = R ∩ [0, 1] of real numbers. Let
σR[0,1] ⊂
∗R[0,1] be the subset of
standard members. We can extend the usual order structure on R[0,1] to a
partial order structure on ∗R[0,1]:
1. for real numbers x, y ∈ R[0,1] we have x ≤ y in R[0,1] iff [f ] ≤ [g] in
∗R[0,1], where {α ∈ N : f(α) = x} ∈ U and {α ∈ N : g(α) = y} ∈ U ,
2. each positive real number ∗x ∈ σR[0,1] is greater than any number [f ] ∈
∗R[0,1]\
σR[0,1],
As before, these conditions have the following informal sense:
1. The sets σR[0,1] and R[0,1] have isomorphic order structure.
2. The set ∗R[0,1] contains actual infinities that are less than any positive
real number of σR[0,1].
Define this partial order structure on ∗R[0,1] as follows:
O∗R 1. For any hyperreal numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗R[0,1], we set [f ] ≤ [g] if
{α ∈ N : f(α) ≤ g(α)} ∈ U .
2. For any hyperreal numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗R[0,1], we set [f ] < [g] if {α ∈
N : f(α) ≤ g(α)} ∈ U and [f ] 6= [g], i.e., {α ∈ N : f(α) 6= g(α)} ∈ U .
3. For any hyperreal numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗R[0,1], we set [f ] = [g] if f ∈ [g].
Introduce two operations max, min in the partial order structure O∗R:
1. for all hyperreal numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗R[0,1], min([f ], [g]) = [f ] if and only
if [f ] ≤ [g] under condition O∗R,
2. for all hyperreal numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗R[0,1], max([f ], [g]) = [g] if and only
if [f ] ≤ [g] under condition O∗R,
3. for all hyperreal numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗R[0,1], min([f ], [g]) = max([f ], [g]) =
[f ] = [g] if and only if [f ] = [g] under condition O∗R,
4. for all hyperreal numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗R[0,1], if [f ], [g] are incompatible under
condition O∗R, then min([f ], [g]) = [h] iff there exists [h] ∈ ∗R[0,1] such
that
{α ∈ N : min(f(α), g(α)) = h(α)} ∈ U .
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5. for all hyperreal numbers [f ], [g] ∈ ∗R[0,1], if [f ], [g] are incompatible under
condition O∗R, then max([f ], [g]) = [h] iff there exists [h] ∈ ∗R[0,1] such
that
{α ∈ N : max(f(α), g(α)) = h(α)} ∈ U .
Note there exist the maximal number ∗1 ∈ ∗R[0,1] and the minimal number
∗0 ∈ ∗R[0,1] under condition O∗R.
8.4 Hyper-valued matrix logics
Now define hyperrational-valued  Lukasiewicz’s logic M∗Q:
Definition 17 The ordered system 〈V∗Q,¬L,→L,∨,∧, ∃˜, ∀˜, {∗1}〉 is called hyper-
rational valued  Lukasiewicz’s matrix logic M∗Q, where
1. V∗Q =
∗Q[0,1] is the subset of hyperrational numbers,
2. for all [x] ∈ V∗Q, ¬L[x] = ∗1− [x],
3. for all [x], [y] ∈ V∗Q, [x]→L [y] = min(
∗1, ∗1− [x] + [y]),
4. for all [x], [y] ∈ V∗Q, [x] ∨ [y] = ([x]→L [y])→L [y] = max([x], [y]),
5. for all [x], [y] ∈ V∗Q, [x] ∧ [y] = ¬L(¬L[x] ∨ ¬L[y]) = min([x], [y]),
6. for a subset M ⊆ V∗Q, ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ V∗Q, ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
8. {∗1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value ∗0 ∈ V∗Q is false, the truth value ∗1 ∈ V∗Q is true, and
other truth values x ∈ V∗Q\{∗0, ∗1} are neutral.
Continuing in the same way, define hyperreal valued  Lukasiewicz’s matrix
logic M∗R:
Definition 18 The ordered system 〈V∗R,¬L,→L,∨,∧, ∃˜, ∀˜, {∗1}〉 is called hyper-
real valued  Lukasiewicz’s matrix logic M∗R, where
1. V∗R =
∗R[0,1] is the subset of hyperreal numbers,
2. for all [x] ∈ V∗R, ¬L[x] = ∗1− [x],
3. for all [x], [y] ∈ V∗R, [x]→L [y] = min(
∗1, ∗1− [x] + [y]),
4. for all [x], [y] ∈ V∗R, [x] ∨ [y] = ([x]→L [y])→L [y] = max([x], [y]),
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5. for all [x], [y] ∈ V∗R, [x] ∧ [y] = ¬L(¬L[x] ∨ ¬L[y]) = min([x], [y]),
6. for a subset M ⊆ V∗R, ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ V∗R, ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
8. {∗1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value ∗0 ∈ V∗R is false, the truth value ∗1 ∈ V∗R is true, and
other truth values x ∈ V∗R\{∗0, ∗1} are neutral.
Definition 19 Hyper-valued Go¨del’s matrix logic G∗[0,1] is the structure 〈
∗[0, 1],
¬G, →G, ∨, ∧, ∃˜, ∀˜, {∗1}〉, where
1. for all [x] ∈ ∗[0, 1], ¬G[x] = [x]→G ∗0,
2. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗[0, 1], [x] →G [y] = ∗1 if [x] 6 [y] and [x] →G [y] = [y]
otherwise,
3. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗[0, 1], [x] ∨ [y] = max([x], [y]),
4. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗[0, 1], [x] ∧ [y] = min([x], [y]),
5. for a subset M ⊆ ∗[0, 1], ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
6. for a subset M ⊆ ∗[0, 1], ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
7. {∗1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value ∗0 ∈ ∗[0, 1] is false, the truth value ∗1 ∈ ∗[0, 1] is true, and
other truth values [x] ∈ ∗(0, 1) are neutral.
Definition 20 Hyper-valued Product matrix logic Π∗[0,1] is the structure 〈
∗[0, 1],
¬Π, →Π, &Π, ∧, ∨, ∃˜, ∀˜, {∗1}〉, where
1. for all [x] ∈ ∗[0, 1], ¬Π[x] = [x]→Π
∗0,
2. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗[0, 1], [x]→Π [y] =
{
∗1, if [x] 6 [y],
min(∗1, [y][x]), otherwise;
3. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗[0, 1], [x]&Π[y] = [x] · [y],
4. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗[0, 1], [x] ∧ [y] = [x] · ([x]→Π [y]),
5. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗[0, 1], [x]∨ [y] = (([x]→Π [y])→Π [y])∧ (([y]→Π [x])→Π
[x]),
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6. for a subset M ⊆ ∗[0, 1], ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ ∗[0, 1], ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
8. {∗1} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value ∗0 ∈ ∗[0, 1] is false, the truth value ∗1 ∈ ∗[0, 1] is true, and
other truth values [x] ∈ ∗(0, 1) are neutral.
8.5 Hyper-valued probability theory and hyper-
valued fuzzy logic
Let X be an arbitrary set and let A be an algebra of subsets A ⊆ X , i.e.
1. union, intersection, and difference of two subsets of X also belong to A;
2. ∅, X belong to A.
Recall that a finitely additive probability measure is a nonnegative set func-
tion P(·) defined for sets A ∈ A that satisfies the following properties:
1. P(A) ≥ 0 for all A ∈ A,
2. P(X) = 1 and P(∅) = 0,
3. if A ∈ A and B ∈ A are disjoint, then P(A ∪ B) = P(A) + P(B). In
particular P(¬A) = 1−P(A) for all A ∈ A.
The algebra A is called a σ-algebra if it is assumed to be closed under
countable union (or equivalently, countable intersection), i.e. if for every n,
An ∈ A causes A =
⋃
n
An ∈ A.
A set function P(·) defined on a σ-algebra is called a countable additive prob-
ability measure (or a σ-additive probability measure) if in addition to satisfying
equations of the definition of finitely additive probability measure, it satisfies
the following countable additivity property: for any sequence of pairwise disjoint
sets An, P(A) =
∑
n
P(An). The ordered system 〈X,A,P〉 is called a probability
space.
Now consider hyper-valued probabilities. Let I be an arbitrary set, let A be
an algebra of subsets A ⊆ I, and let U be a Frechet ultrafilter on I. Set for
A ∈ A:
µU (A) =
{
1, A ∈ U ;
0, A /∈ U .
Hence, there is a mapping µU : A → {0, 1} satisfying the following properties:
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1. µU (∅) = 0, µU (I) = 1;
2. if µU (A1) = µU (A2) = 0, then µU(A1 ∪A2) = 0;
3. if A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, then µU(A1 ∪A2) = µU (A1) + µU (A2).
This implies that µU is a probability measure. Notice that µU isn’t σ-
additive. As an example, if A is the set of even numbers and B is the set of odd
numbers, then A ∈ U implies B /∈ U , because the filter U is maximal. Thus,
µU(A) = 1 and µU (B) = 0, although the cardinalities of A and B are equal.
The ordered system 〈I,A, µU 〉 is called a probability space.
Let’s consider a mapping: f : I ∋ α 7→ f(α) ∈ M . Two mappings f , g are
equivalent: f ∽ g if µU ({α ∈ I : f(α) = g(α)}) = 1. An equivalence class of f is
called a probabilistic events and is denoted by [f ]. The set ∗M is the set of all
probabilistic events of M . This ∗M is a proper nonstandard extension defined
above.
Under condition 1 of proposition 7, we can obtain a nonstandard extension
of an algebra A denoted by ∗A. Let ∗X be an arbitrary nonstandard exten-
sion. Then the nonstandard algebra ∗A is an algebra of subsets A ⊆ ∗X if the
following conditions hold:
1. union, intersection, and difference of two subsets of ∗X also belong to ∗A;
2. ∅, ∗X belong to ∗A.
Definition 21 A hyperrational (respectively hyperreal) valued finitely additive
probability measure is a nonnegative set function ∗P : ∗A → V∗Q (respectively
∗P : ∗A → V∗R) that satisfies the following properties:
1. ∗P(A) ≥ ∗0 for all A ∈ ∗A,
2. ∗P(∗X) = ∗1 and ∗P(∅) = ∗0,
3. if A ∈ ∗A and B ∈ ∗A are disjoint, then ∗P(A ∪ B) = ∗P(A) + ∗P(B).
In particular ∗P(¬A) = ∗1− ∗P(A) for all A ∈ ∗A.
Now consider hyper-valued fuzzy logic.
Definition 22 Suppose ∗X is a nonstandard extension. Then a hyperrational
(respectively hyperreal) valued fuzzy set A in ∗X is a set defined by means of the
membership function ∗µA:
∗X → V∗Q (respectively by means of the membership
function ∗µA:
∗X → V∗R).
A set A ⊆ ∗X is called crisp if ∗µA(u) = ∗1 or ∗µA(u) = ∗0 for any u ∈ ∗X .
The logical operations on hyper-valued fuzzy sets are defined as follows:
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1. ∗µA∩B(x) = min(
∗µA(x),
∗µB(x));
2. ∗µA∪B(x) = max(
∗µA(x),
∗µB(x));
3. ∗µA+B(x) =
∗µA(x) +
∗µB(x) − ∗µA(x) · ∗µB(x);
4. ∗µ¬A(x) = ¬∗µA(x) = ∗1− ∗µA(x).
Chapter 9
p-Adic valued logics
9.1 Preliminaries
Let us remember that the expansion
n = α−N ·p−N+α−N+1 ·p−N+1+. . .+α−1 ·p−1+α0+α1 ·p+. . .+αk ·pk+. . . =
+∞∑
k=−N
αk · pk,
where αk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, ∀k ∈ Z, and α−N 6= 0, is called the canoni-
cal expansion of p-adic number n (or p-adic expansion for n). The number
n is called p-adic. This number can be identified with sequences of digits:
n = . . . α2α1α0, α−1α−2 . . . α−N . We denote the set of such numbers by Qp.
The expansion n = α0 + α1 · p + . . . + αk · pk + . . . =
∞∑
k=0
αk · pk, where
αk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, ∀k ∈ N ∪ {0}, is called the expansion of p-adic integer
n. The integer n is called p-adic. This number sometimes has the following
notation: n = . . . α3α2α1α0. We denote the set of such numbers by Zp.
If n ∈ Zp, n 6= 0, and its canonical expansion contains only a finite number
of nonzero digits αj , then n is natural number (and vice versa). But if n ∈ Zp
and its expansion contains an infinite number of nonzero digits αj , then n is an
infinitely large natural number. Thus the set of p-adic integers contains actual
infinities n ∈ Zp\N, n 6= 0. This is one of the most important features of non-
Archimedean number systems, therefore it is natural to compare Zp with the set
of nonstandard numbers ∗Z. Also, the set Zp contains non-exclusive elements.
It is evident that Qp = {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}Z\U and Zp = {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}N\U .
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9.2 p-Adic valued partial order structure
Extend the standard order structure on {0, . . . , p−1} to a partial order structure
on Zp. Define this partial order structure on Zp as follows:
OZp Let x = . . . xn . . . x1x0 and y = . . . yn . . . y1y0 be the canonical expansions
of two p-adic integers x, y ∈ Zp.
1. We set x ≤ y if we have xn ≤ yn for each n = 0, 1, . . .
2. We set x < y if we have xn ≤ yn for each n = 0, 1, . . . and there
exists n0 such that xn0 < yn0 .
3. We set x = y if xn = yn for each n = 0, 1, . . .
Now introduce two operations max, min in the partial order structure on Zp:
1 for all p-adic integers x, y ∈ Zp, min(x, y) = x if and only if x ≤ y under
condition OZp ,
2 for all p-adic integers x, y ∈ Zp, max(x, y) = y if and only if x ≤ y under
condition OZp ,
3 for all p-adic integers x, y ∈ Zp, max(x, y) = min(x, y) = x = y if and only if
x = y under condition OZp .
The ordering relation OZp is not linear, but partial, because there exist el-
ements x, z ∈ Zp, which are incompatible. As an example, let p = 2 and let
x = − 13 = . . . 10101 . . .101, z = −
2
3 = . . . 01010 . . .010. Then the numbers x
and z are incompatible.
Thus,
4 Let x = . . . xn . . . x1x0 and y = . . . yn . . . y1y0 be the canonical expansions of
two p-adic integers x, y ∈ Zp and x, y are incompatible under condition
OZp . We get min(x, y) = z = . . . zn . . . z1z0, where, for each n = 0, 1, . . .,
we set
1. zn = yn if xn ≥ yn,
2. zn = xn if xn ≤ yn,
3. zn = xn = yn if xn = yn.
We get max(x, y) = z = . . . zn . . . z1z0, where, for each n = 0, 1, . . ., we set
1. zn = yn if xn ≤ yn,
2. zn = xn if xn ≥ yn,
3. zn = xn = yn if xn = yn.
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It is important to remark that there exists the maximal number Nmax ∈ Zp
under condition OZp . It is easy to see:
Nmax = −1 = (p− 1) + (p− 1) · p+ . . .+ (p− 1) · p
k + . . . =
∞∑
k=0
(p− 1) · pk
Therefore
5 min(x,Nmax) = x and max(x,Nmax) = Nmax for any x ∈ Zp.
9.3 p-Adic valued matrix logics
Now consider p-adic valued  Lukasiewicz’s matrix logic MZp .
Definition 23 The ordered system 〈VZp ,¬L,→L,∨,∧, ∃˜, ∀˜, {Nmax}〉 is called
p-adic valued  Lukasiewicz’s matrix logic MZp , where
1. VZp = {0, . . . , Nmax} = Zp,
2. for all x ∈ VZp , ¬Lx = Nmax − x,
3. for all x, y ∈ VZp , x→L y = (Nmax −max(x, y) + y),
4. for all x, y ∈ VZp , x ∨ y = (x→L y)→L y = max(x, y),
5. for all x, y ∈ VZp , x ∧ y = ¬L(¬Lx ∨ ¬Ly) = min(x, y),
6. for a subset M ⊆ VZp , ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ VZp , ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
8. {Nmax} is the set of designated truth values.
The truth value 0 ∈ Zp is false, the truth value Nmax ∈ Zp is true, and other
truth values x ∈ Zp{0, Nmax} are neutral.
Definition 24 p-Adic valued Go¨del’s matrix logic GZp is the structure 〈VZp ,
¬G, →G, ∨, ∧, ∃˜, ∀˜, {Nmax}〉, where
1. VZp = {0, . . . , Nmax} = Zp,
2. for all x ∈ VZp , ¬Gx = x→G 0,
3. for all x, y ∈ VZp , x→G y = Nmax if x 6 y and x→G y = y otherwise,
4. for all x, y ∈ VZp , x ∨ y = max(x, y),
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5. for all x, y ∈ VZp , x ∧ y = min(x, y),
6. for a subset M ⊆ VZp , ∃˜(M) = max(M), where max(M) is a maximal
element of M ,
7. for a subset M ⊆ VZp , ∀˜(M) = min(M), where min(M) is a minimal
element of M ,
8. {Nmax} is the set of designated truth values.
Definition 25 p-Adic valued Post’s matrix logic PZp is the structure 〈VZp ,¬P ,
∨, {Nmax}〉, where
1. VZp = Zp,
2. for all . . . xn . . . x1x0 ∈ VZp , ¬P . . . xn . . . x1x0 = . . . yn . . . y1y0, where
yj = xj + 1 mod p
for each j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
3. for all x, y ∈ VZp , x ∨ y = max(x, y),
4. {Nmax} is the set of designated truth values.
Proposition 11 The 2-adic valued logic MZ2 = 〈VZ2 , ¬L, →L, ∨, ∧, ∃˜, ∀˜,
{Nmax}〉 is a Boolean algebra.
Proof. Indeed, the operation ¬L in MZ2 is the Boolean complement:
1. max(x,¬Lx) = Nmax,
2. min(x,¬Lx) = 0. ✷
9.4 p-Adic probability theory and p-adic fuzzy
logic
Let us remember that the frequency theory of probability was created by von
Mises in [97]. This theory is based on the notion of a collective: “We will say
that a collective is a mass phenomenon or a repetitive event, or simply a long
sequence of observations for which there are sufficient reasons to believe that
the relative frequency of the observed attribute would tend to a fixed limit if the
observations were infinitely continued. This limit will be called the probability
of the attribute considered within the given collective” [97].
As an example, consider a random experiment S and by L = {s1, . . . , sm}
denote the set of all possible results of this experiment. The set S is called
the label set, or the set of attributes. Suppose there are N realizations of
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S and write a result xj after each realization. Then we obtain the finite
sample: x = (x1, . . . , xN ), xj ∈ L. A collective is an infinite idealization of
this finite sample: x = (x1, . . . , xN , . . .), xj ∈ L. Let us compute frequencies
νN (α;x) = nN (α;x)/N , where nN(α;x) is the number of realizations of the
attribute α in the first N tests. There exists the statistical stabilization of rel-
ative frequencies: the frequency νN (α;x) approaches a limit as N approaches
infinity for every label α ∈ L. This limit P(α) = lim νN (α;x) is said to be the
probability of the label α in the frequency theory of probability. Sometimes
this probability is denoted by Px(α) to show a dependence on the collective x.
Notice that the limits of relative frequencies have to be stable with respect to
a place selection (a choice of a subsequence) in the collective. Khrennikov
developed von Mises’ idea and proposed the frequency theory of p-adic prob-
ability in [79], [80]. We consider here some basic definitions of Khrennikov’s
theory.
We shall study some ensembles S = SN , which have a p-adic volume N ,
where N is the p-adic integer. If N is finite, then S is the ordinary finite ensem-
ble. If N is infinite, then S has essentially p-adic structure. Consider a sequence
of ensembles Mj having volumes lj · pj , j = 0, 1, . . . Get S =
∞⋃
j=0
Mj . Then the
cardinality |S| = N . We may imagine an ensemble S as Get S = ∪∞j=0Mj .
Then the cardinality |S| = N . We may imagine an ensemble S as being the
population of a tower T = TS , which has an infinite number of floors with the
following distribution of population through floors: population of j-th floor is
Mj. Set Tk = ∪kj=0Mj . This is population of the first k + 1 floors. Let A ⊂ S
and let there exists: n(A) = lim
k→∞
nk(A), where nk(A) = |A∩Tk|. The quantity
n(A) is said to be a p-adic volume of the set A.
We define the probability of A by the standard proportional relation:
P(A) , PS(A) =
n(A)
N
, (9.1)
where |S| = N , n(A) = |A ∩ S|.
We denote the family of all A ⊂ S, for which P(A) exists, by GS . The sets
A ∈ GS are said to be events. The ordered system 〈S,GS ,PS〉 is called a p-adic
ensemble probability space for the ensemble S.
Proposition 12 Let F be the set algebra which consists of all finite subsets and
their complements. Then F ⊂ GS .
Proof. Let A be a finite set. Then n(A) = |A| and the probability of A has the
form:
P(A) =
|A|
|S|
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Now let B = ¬A. Then |B ∩ Tk| = |Tk| − |A ∩ Tk|. Hence there exists
lim
k→∞
|B ∩ Tk| = N − |A|. This equality implies the standard formula:
P(¬A) = 1−P(A)
In particular, we have: P(S) = 1. ✷
The next propositions are proved in [79]:
Proposition 13 Let A1, A2 ∈ GS and A1 ∩ A2 = ∅. Then A1 ∪A2 ∈ GS and
P(A1 ∪ A2) = P(A1) +P(A2).
✷
Proposition 14 Let A1, A2 ∈ GS. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. A1 ∪ A2 ∈ GS ,
2. A1 ∩ A2 ∈ GS ,
3. A1\A2 ∈ GS ,
4. A2\A1 ∈ GS . ✷
But it is possible to find sets A1, A2 ∈ GS such that, for example, A1 ∪A2 /∈
GS . Thus, the family GS is not an algebra, but a semi-algebra (it is closed only
with respect to a finite unions of sets, which have empty intersections). GS is
not closed with respect to countable unions of such sets.
Proposition 15 Let A ∈ GS, P(A) 6= 0 and B ∈ GA. Then B ∈ GS and the
following Bayes formula holds:
PA(B) =
PS(B)
PS(A)
(9.2)
Proof. The tower TA of the A has the following population structure: there are
MAj elements on the j-th floor. In particular, TAk = Tk ∩ A. Thus
nAk(B) = |B ∩ TAk | = |B ∩ Tk| = nk(B)
for each B ⊂ A. Hence the existence of nA(B) = lim
k→∞
nAk(B) implies the
existence of nS(B) with nS(B) = lim
k→∞
nk(B). Moreover, nS(B) = nA(B).
Therefore,
PA(B) =
nA(B)
nS(A)
=
nA(B)/|S|
nS(A)/|S|
.
✷
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Proposition 16 Let N ∈ Zp, N 6= 0 and let the ensemble S−1 have the p-adic
volume −1 = Nmax (it is the largest ensemble).
1. Then SN ∈ GS−1 and
PS−1(SN ) =
|SN |
|S−1|
= −N
2. Then GSN ⊂ GS−1 and probabilities PSN (A) are calculated as conditional
probabilities with respect to the subensemble SN of ensemble S−1:
PSN (A) = PS−1(
A
SN
) =
PS−1(A)
PS−1(SN )
, A ∈ GSN
✷
Transform the  Lukasiewicz matrix logic MZp into a p-adic probability
theory. Let us remember that a formula ϕ has the truth value 0 ∈ Zp in MZp if
ϕ is false, a formula ϕ has the truth value Nmax ∈ Zp in MZp if ϕ is true, and
a formula ϕ has other truth values α ∈ Zp\{0, Nmax} in MZp if ϕ is neutral.
Definition 26 A function P(ϕ) is said to be a probability measure of a formula
ϕ in MZp if P(ϕ) ranges over numbers of Qp and satisfies the following axioms:
1. P(ϕ) = valI(ϕ)
Nmax
, where valI(ϕ) is a truth value of ϕ;
2. if a conjunction ϕ∧ψ has the truth value 0, then P(ϕ∨ψ) = P(ϕ)+P(ψ),
3. P(ϕ ∧ ψ) = min(P(ϕ),P(ψ)).
Notice that:
1. taking into account condition 1 of our definition, if ϕ has the truth value
Nmax for any its interpretations, i.e. ϕ is a tautology, then P(ϕ) = 1 in all
possible worlds, and if ϕ has the truth value 0 for any its interpretations,
i.e. ϕ is a contradiction, then P(ϕ) = 0 in all possible worlds;
2. under condition 1, we obtain also P(¬ϕ) = 1−P(ϕ).
Since P(Nmax) = 1, we have
P(max{x ∈ VZp}) =
∑
x∈VZp
P(x) = 1
All events have a conditional plausibility in the logical theory of p-adic prob-
ability:
P(ϕ)↔ P(ϕ/Nmax), (9.3)
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i.e., for any ϕ, we consider the conditional plausibility that there is an event of
ϕ, given an event Nmax,
P(ϕ/ψ) =
P(ϕ ∧ ψ)
P(ψ)
. (9.4)
The probability interpretation of the  Lukasiewicz logic MZp shows that
this logic is a special system of fuzzy logic. Indeed, we can consider the mem-
bership function µA as a p-adic valued predicate.
Definition 27 Suppose X is a non-empty set. Then a p-adic valued fuzzy set
A in X is a set defined by means of the membership function µA: X → Zp,
where Zp is the set of all p-adic integers.
It is obvious that the set A is completely determined by the set of tuples
{〈u, µA(u)〉 : u ∈ X}. We define a norm | · |p : Qp → R on Qp as follows:
|n =
+∞∑
k=−N
αk · p
k|p , p
−L,
where L = max{k : n ≡ 0 mod pk} ≥ 0, i.e. L is an index of the first number
distinct from zero in p-adic expansion of n. Note that |0|p , 0. The function
| · |p has values 0 and {pγ}γ∈Z on Qp. Finally, |x|p ≥ 0 and |x|p = 0 ↔ x = 0.
A set A ⊂ X is called crisp if |µA(u)|p = 1 or |µA(u)|p = 0 for any u ∈ X .
Notice that |µA(u) = 1|p = 1 and |µA(u) = 0|p = 0. Therefore our membership
function is an extension of the classical characteristic function. Thus, A = B
causes µA(u) = µB(u) for all u ∈ X and A ⊆ B causes |µA(u)|p 6 |µB(u)|p for
all u ∈ X .
In p-adic fuzzy logic, there always exists a non-empty intersection of two
crisp sets. In fact, suppose the sets A, B have empty intersection and A, B
are crisp. Consider two cases under condition µA(u) 6= µB(u) for any u. First,
|µA(u)|p = 0 or |µA(u)|p = 1 for all u and secondly |µB(u)|p = 0 or |µB(u)|p = 1
for all u. Assume we have µA(u0) = Nmax for some u0, i.e., |µA(u0)|p = 1.
Then µB(u0) 6= Nmax, but this doesn’t mean that µB(u0) = 0. It is possible
that |µA(u0)|p = 1 and |µB(u0)|p = 1 for u0.
Now we set logical operations on p-adic fuzzy sets:
1. µA∩B(x) = min(µA(x), µB(x));
2. µA∪B(x) = max(µA(x), µB(x));
3. µA+B(x) = µA(x) + µB(x)−min(µA(x), µB(x));
4. µ¬A(x) = ¬µA(x) = Nmax − µA(x) = −1− µA(x).
Chapter 10
Fuzzy logics
10.1 Preliminaries
In this section we cover the main essentials of the t-norm based approach, defin-
ing fuzzy logics as logics based on t-norms and their residua. Recall that t-norm
is an operation ∗ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] which is commutative and associative, non-
decreasing in both arguments and have 1 as unit element and 0 as zero element,
i.e.
x ∗ y = y ∗ x,
(x ∗ y) ∗ z = x ∗ (y ∗ z),
x ≤ x′ and y ≤ y′ implies x ∗ y ≤ x′ ∗ y′,
1 ∗ x = x, 0 ∗ x = 0.
Each t-norm determines uniquely its corresponding implication ⇒ (residuum)
satisfying for all x, y, z ∈ [0, 1],
z ≤ x⇒ y iff x ∗ z ≤ y
The following are important examples of continuous t-norms and their residua:
1.  Lukasiewicz’s logic:
• x ∗ y = max(x+ y − 1, 0),
• x⇒ y = 1 for x ≤ y and x⇒ y = 1− x+ y otherwise.
In this logic ∗ and ⇒ are denoted by &L and →L respectively.
2. Go¨del’s logic:
• x ∗ y = min(x, y),
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• x⇒ y = 1 for x ≤ y and x⇒ y = y otherwise.
In this logic ∗ and ⇒ are denoted by &G and →G respectively.
3. Product logic:
• x ∗ y = x · y
• x⇒ y = 1 for x ≤ y and x⇒ y = y/x otherwise.
In this logic ∗ and ⇒ are denoted by &Π and →Π respectively.
A regular residuated lattice (or a BL-algebra) is an algebra LL = 〈L, ∧, ∨,
∗, ⇒, 0, 1〉 such that (1) 〈L,∧,∨, 0, 1〉 is a lattice with the largest element 1
and the least element 0, (2) 〈L, ∗, 1〉 is a commutative semigroup with the unit
element 1, i.e. ∗ is commutative, associative, and 1 ∗ x = x for all x, (3) the
following conditions hold
z ≤ (x⇒ y) iff x ∗ z ≤ y for all x, y, z;
x ∧ y = x ∗ (x⇒ y);
x ∨ y = ((x⇒ y)⇒ y) ∧ ((y ⇒ x)⇒ x),
(x⇒ y) ∨ (y ⇒ x) = 1.
It is known the following result. Let ∗ be a continuous t-norm with residuum
⇒, then A = 〈[0, 1],min,max, ∗, ⇒, 0, 1〉 is a BL-algebra, called a standard
BL-algebra; if ∗ is the  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del or Product t-norm then A is an
 L-algebra, G-algebra or Π-algebra respectively, called the standard  L-algebra,
G-algebra or Π-algebra.
Let us remember that every relation R of Dn can be represented by its char-
acteristic function cR : D
n → {0, 1} defined by setting cR(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 if
〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ R and cR(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 if 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 /∈ R. We can also repre-
sent the extension of a vague predicate by a generalized characteristic function
assuming values in a set V . Assume that V = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} or V = [0, 1]. A
fuzzy relation or fuzzy subset P of Dn is any map P : Dn → V . For instance,
the subset ∅ ⊂ Dn (resp. Dn ⊆ Dn) can be represented by a fuzzy relation P
that is considered as the constant map P : Dn ∋ x 7→ 0 (resp. P : Dn ∋ x 7→ 1),
where 0 is the least element of V and 1 is the largest element of V . We denote
by F(Dn) the class of fuzzy subsets of Dn. It is obvious that P(Dn) ⊂ F(Dn),
where P(Dn) is the powerset.
Let 1 be the top element of V . Observe that, if P and P ′ are fuzzy subsets
of Dn, then we can define,
• the inclusion by setting P ⊆ P ′ iff P (x1, . . . , xn) ≤ P ′(x1, . . . , xn) for
every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ Dn,
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•  Lukasiewicz’s relative complement P →L P ′ by setting (P →L P ′) (x1,
. . . , xn) = 1 −max(P (x1, . . . , xn), P ′(x1, . . . , xn)) + P ′(x1, . . . , xn) for
every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ D
n,
•  Lukasiewicz’s complement ¬LP of P by setting (¬LP )(x1, . . . , xn) =
1− P (x1, . . . , xn) for every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ Dn,
•  Lukasiewicz’s intersection P&LP
′ as (P&LP
′)(x1, . . . , xn) = max(0,
P (x1, . . . , xn) + P
′(x1, . . . , xn)− 1) for every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ Dn,
• the Product relative complement P →Π P ′ by setting (P →Π P ′)(x1, . . . ,
xn) = 1 if P (x1, . . . , xn) ≤ P ′(x1, . . . , xn) for every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ Dn
and (P →Π P ′)(x1, . . . , xn) =
P (x1,...,xn)
P ′(x1,...,xn)
otherwise,
• the Product complement ¬ΠP as ¬ΠP (x1, . . . , xn) := P (x1, . . . , xn)→Π 0
for every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ Dn,
• the Product intersection P&ΠP ′ as (P&ΠP ′)(x1, . . . , xn) = P (x1, . . . ,
xn) · P
′(x1, . . . , xn) for every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ D
n,
• the union P ∨ P ′ as (P ∨ P ′)(x1, . . . , xn) = max(P (x1, . . . , xn), P ′(x1,
. . . , xn)) for every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ Dn,
• the intersection P ∧ P ′ by setting (P ∧ P ′)(x1, . . . , xn) = min(P (x1, . . . ,
xn), P
′(x1, . . . , xn)) for every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ Dn,
• the union
∨
i∈I
Pi, given a family (Pi)i∈I of fuzzy subsets of D
n, as
∨
i∈I
Pi(x1, . . . , xn) = max{Pi(x1, . . . , xn) : i ∈ I}
for every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ D
n,
• the intersection
∧
i∈I
Pi, given a family (Pi)i∈I of fuzzy subsets of D
n, as
∧
i∈I
Pi(x1, . . . , xn) = min{Pi(x1, . . . , xn) : i ∈ I}
for every 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ Dn.
The structure LV = 〈F(D
n), ∧, ∨, ∗, ⇒, ⊥(Dn), ⊤(Dn)〉 is a BL-algebra,
where ⊥(Dn) and ⊤(Dn) are the constant maps ⊥(Dn) : Dn ∋ x 7→ 0 ∈ V and
⊤(Dn) : Dn ∋ x 7→ 1 ∈ V respectively. It is the direct power, with index set
Dn, of the structure 〈V , ∧, ∨, ∗, ⇒, 0, 1〉.
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10.2 Basic fuzzy logic BL∀
The basic fuzzy logic denoted by BL∀ has just two initial propositional oper-
ations: &, →, which are understood as t-norm and its residuum respectively.
The negation is derivable:
¬ψ =: ψ → ⊥,
where ⊥ is the truth constant ‘falsehood’.
In BL∀ we can define the following new operations:
• ϕ ∧ ψ := ϕ&(ϕ→ ψ),
• ϕ ∨ ψ := ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ) ∧ ((ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ),
• ϕ↔ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ)&(ψ → ϕ),
• ϕ⊕ ψ := ¬ϕ→ ψ,
• ϕ⊖ ψ := ϕ&¬ψ.
The Hilbert’s type calculus for BL∀ consists of the following axioms:
(ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ)), (10.1)
(ϕ&ψ)→ ϕ, (10.2)
(ϕ&ψ)→ (ψ&ϕ), (10.3)
(ϕ&(ϕ→ ψ))→ (ψ&(ψ → ϕ)), (10.4)
(ϕ→ (ψ → χ))→ ((ϕ&ψ)→ χ), (10.5)
((ϕ&ψ)→ χ)→ (ϕ→ (ψ → χ)), (10.6)
((ϕ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (((ψ → ϕ)→ χ)→ χ), (10.7)
⊥ → ψ, (10.8)
∀x ϕ(x)→ ϕ[x/t], (10.9)
ϕ[x/t]→ ∃x ϕ(x), (10.10)
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where the formula ϕ[x/t] is the result of substituting the term t for all free
occurrences of x in ϕ,
∀x(χ→ ϕ)→ (χ→ ∀xϕ), (10.11)
∀x(ϕ→ χ)→ (∃xϕ→ χ), (10.12)
∀x(χ ∨ ϕ)→ (χ ∨ ∀xϕ), (10.13)
where x is not free in χ.
In BL∀ there are the following inference rules:
1. Modus ponens : from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ:
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
.
2. Substitution rule: we can substitute any formulas for propositional vari-
ables.
3. Generalization: from ϕ infer ∀x ϕ(x):
ϕ
∀x ϕ(x)
.
Theorem 4 (Soundness and Completeness) Let ϕ be a formula of BL∀,
T a BL∀-theory. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
• T ⊢ ϕ;
• valI(ϕ) = 1 for each BL-algebra (with infinite intersection and infinite
union) that is model for T .
Proof. See [67]. ✷
10.3 Non-Archimedean valued BL-algebras
Now introduce the following new operations defined for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗Q in the
partial order structure O∗Q:
• [x]→L [y] = ∗1−max([x], [y]) + [y],
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• [x]→Π [y] = ∗1 if [x] ≤ [y] and [x]→Π [y] = min(∗1,
[y]
[x]) otherwise,
notice that we have min(∗1, [y][x]) = [h] iff there exists [h] ∈
∗Q[0,1] such
that {α ∈ N : min(1, y(α)
x(α)) = h(α)} ∈ U , let us also remember that the
members [x], [y] can be incompatible under O∗Q,
• ¬L[x] =
∗1− [x], i.e. [x]→L
∗0,
• ¬Π[x] =
∗1 if [x] = ∗0 and ¬Π[x] =
∗0 otherwise, i.e. ¬Π[x] = [x]→Π
∗0,
• ∆[x] = ∗1 if [x] = ∗1 and ∆[x] = ∗0 otherwise, i.e. ∆[x] = ¬Π¬L[x],
• [x]&L[y] = max([x],
∗1− [y]) + [y]− ∗1, i.e. [x]&L[y] = ¬L([x]→L ¬L[y]),
• [x]&Π[y] = [x] · [y],
• [x]⊕ [y] := ¬L[x]→L [y],
• [x]⊖ [y] := [x]&L¬L[y],
• [x] ∧ [y] = min([x], [y]), i.e. [x] ∧ [y] = [x]&L([x]→L [y]),
• [x] ∨ [y] = max([x], [y]), i.e. [x] ∨ [y] = ([x]→L [y])→L [y],
• [x] →G [y] = ∗1 if [x] ≤ [y] and [x] →G [y] = [y] otherwise, i.e. [x] →G
[y] = ∆([x]→L [y]) ∨ [y],
• ¬G[x] := [x]→G ∗0.
A hyperrational valued BL-matrix is a structure L∗Q = 〈∗Q[0,1], ∧, ∨, ∗, ⇒,
∗0, ∗1〉 such that (1) 〈∗Q[0,1],∧,∨,
∗0, ∗1〉 is a lattice with the largest element
∗1 and the least element ∗0, (2) 〈∗Q[0,1], ∗,
∗1〉 is a commutative semigroup with
the unit element ∗1, i.e. ∗ is commutative, associative, and ∗1 ∗ [x] = [x] for all
[x] ∈ ∗Q[0,1], (3) the following conditions hold
[z] ≤ ([x]⇒ [y]) iff [x] ∗ [z] ≤ [y] for all [x], [y], [z];
[x] ∧ [y] = [x] ∗ ([x]⇒ [y]);
[x] ∨ [y] = (([x]⇒ [y])⇒ [y]) ∧ (([y]⇒ [x])⇒ [x]),
([x]⇒ [y]) ∨ ([y]⇒ [x]) = ∗1.
If we replace the set Q[0,1] by R[0,1] and the set
∗Q[0,1] by
∗R[0,1] in all above
definitions, then we obtain hyperreal valued BL-matrix L∗R. Matrices L∗Q, L∗R
are different versions of a non-Archimedean valued BL-algebra. Continuing in
the same way, we can build non-Archimedean valued  L-algebra, G-algebra, and
Π-algebra.
Further consider the following new operations defined for all x, y ∈ Zp in the
partial order structure OZp :
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• x→L y = Nmax −max(x, y) + y,
• x→Π y = Nmax if x ≤ y and x→Π y = integral part of
y
x
otherwise,
• ¬Lx = Nmax − x, i.e. x→L 0,
• ¬Πx = Nmax if x = 0 and ¬Πx = 0 otherwise, i.e. ¬Πx = x→Π 0,
• ∆x = Nmax if x = Nmax and ∆x = 0 otherwise, i.e. ∆x = ¬Π¬Lx,
• x&Ly = max(x,Nmax − y) + y −Nmax, i.e. x&Ly = ¬L(x→L ¬Ly),
• x&Πy = x · y,
• x⊕ y := ¬Lx→L y,
• x⊖ y := x&L¬Ly,
• x ∧ y = min(x, y), i.e. x ∧ y = x&L(x→L y),
• x ∨ y = max(x, y), i.e. x ∨ y = (x→L y)→L y,
• x →G y = Nmax if x ≤ y and x →G y = y otherwise, i.e. x →G y =
∆(x→L y) ∨ y,
• ¬Gx := x→G 0.
A p-adic valued BL-matrix is a structure LZp = 〈Zp, ∧, ∨, ∗, ⇒, 0, Nmax〉.
10.4 Non-Archimedean valued predicate logical
language
Recall that for each i ∈ [0, 1], ∗i = [f = i], i.e. it is a constant function. Every
element of ∗[0, 1] has the form of infinite tuple [f ] = 〈y0, y1, . . .〉, where yi ∈ [0, 1]
for each i = 0, 1, 2, . . .
Let L be a standard first-order language associated with p-valued (resp.
infinite-valued) semantics. Then we can get an extension L′ of first-order lan-
guage L to set later a language of p-adic valued (resp. hyper-valued) logic.
In L′ we build infinite sequences of well-formed formulas of L:
ψ∞ = 〈ψ1, . . . , ψN , . . . 〉,
ψi = 〈ψ1, . . . , ψi〉,
where ψj ∈ L.
A formula ψ∞ (resp. ψi) is called a formula of infinite length (resp. a formula
of i-th length).
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Definition 28 Logical connectives in hyper-valued logic are defined as follows:
1. ψ∞ ⋆ ϕ∞ = 〈ψ1 ⋆ ϕ1, . . . , ψN ⋆ ϕN , . . .〉, where ⋆ ∈ {&,→};
2. ¬ψ∞ = 〈¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψN , . . .〉;
3. Qxψ∞ = 〈Qxψ1, . . . ,QxψN , . . .〉, Q ∈ {∀, ∃};
4. ψ∞ ⋆ ϕ1 = 〈ψ1 ⋆ ϕ, ψ2 ⋆ ϕ, . . . , ψN ⋆ ϕ, . . .〉, where ⋆ ∈ {&,→}.
Definition 29 Logical connectives in p-adic valued logic are defined as follows:
1. ψ∞ ⋆ ϕ∞ = 〈ψ1 ⋆ ϕ1, . . . , ψN ⋆ ϕN , . . .〉, where ⋆ ∈ {&,→};
2. ¬ψ∞ = 〈¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψN , . . .〉;
3. Qxψ∞ = 〈Qxψ1, . . . ,QxψN , . . .〉, Q ∈ {∀, ∃}.
4. ψ∞ ⋆ ϕi = 〈ψ1 ⋆ ϕ1, . . . , ψi ⋆ ϕi, ψi+1 ⋆ ⊥, ψi+2 ⋆ ⊥, . . . , ψN ⋆ ⊥, . . . 〉,
where ⋆ ∈ {&,→}.
5. suppose i < j, then ψi ⋆ ϕj = 〈ψ1 ⋆ ϕ1, . . . , ψi ⋆ ϕi, ψi+1 ⋆ ⊥, ψi+2 ⋆ ⊥,
. . . , ψj ⋆⊥〉, where ⋆ ∈ {&,→}.
An interpretation for a language L′ is defined in the standard way. Extend
the valuation of L to one of L′ as follows.
Definition 30 Given an interpretation I = 〈M, s〉 and a valuation valI of L,
we define the non-Archimedean i-valuation valiI (resp. ∞-valuation val
∞
I ) to be
a mapping from formulas ϕi (resp. ϕ∞) of L′ to truth value set V i (resp. ∗V )
as follows:
1. valiI(ϕ
i) = 〈valI(ϕ1), . . . , valI(ϕi)〉.
2. val∞I (ϕ
∞) = 〈valI(ϕ1), . . . , valI(ϕN ), . . . 〉.
For example, in p-adic valued case val∞I (ψ
∞ ⋆ ϕi) = 〈valI(ψ1 ⋆ ϕ1), . . . ,
valI(ψi ⋆ ϕi), valI(ψi+1 ⋆ ⊥), valI(ψi+2 ⋆ ⊥), . . . , valI(ψN ⋆ ⊥), . . . 〉, where
⋆ ∈ {&,→}.
Let L∗V be a non-Archimedean valued BL-matrix. Then the valuations val
i
I
and val∞I of L
′ to non-Archimedean valued BL-matrix gives the basic fuzzy logic
with the non-Archimedean valued semantics.
We say that an L∗V -structureM is an i-model (resp. an∞-model) of an L′-
theory T iff valiI(ϕ
i) = 〈1, . . . , 1〉 (resp. val∞I (ϕ
∞) = ∗1) on M for each ϕi ∈ T
(resp. ϕ∞ ∈ T ).
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10.5 Non-Archimedean valued basic fuzzy propo-
sitional logic BL∞
Let us construct a non-Archimedean extension of basic fuzzy propositional logic
BL denoted by BL∞. This logic is built in the language L′ and it has a non-
Archimedean valued BL-matrix as its semantics.
Remember that the logic BL has just two propositional operations: &, →,
which are understood as t-norm and its residuum respectively.
The logic BL∞ is given by the following axioms:
(ϕi → ψi)→ ((ψi → χi)→ (ϕi → χi)), (10.14)
(ϕi&ψi)→ ϕi, (10.15)
(ϕi&ψi)→ (ψi&ϕi), (10.16)
(ϕi&(ϕi → ψi))→ (ψi&(ψi → ϕi)), (10.17)
(ϕi → (ψi → χi))→ ((ϕi&ψi)→ χi), (10.18)
((ϕi&ψi)→ χi)→ (ϕi → (ψi → χi)), (10.19)
((ϕi → ψi)→ χi)→ (((ψi → ϕi)→ χi)→ χi), (10.20)
⊥i → ψi, (10.21)
(ϕ∞ → ψ∞)→ ((ψ∞ → χ∞)→ (ϕ∞ → χ∞)), (10.22)
(ϕ∞&ψ∞)→ ϕ∞, (10.23)
(ϕ∞&ψ∞)→ (ψ∞&ϕ∞), (10.24)
(ϕ∞&(ϕ∞ → ψ∞))→ (ψ∞&(ψ∞ → ϕ∞)), (10.25)
(ϕ∞ → (ψ∞ → χ∞))→ ((ϕ∞&ψ∞)→ χ∞), (10.26)
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((ϕ∞&ψ∞)→ χ∞)→ (ϕ∞ → (ψ∞ → χ∞)), (10.27)
((ϕ∞ → ψ∞)→ χ∞)→ (((ψ∞ → ϕ∞)→ χ∞)→ χ∞), (10.28)
⊥∞ → ψ∞. (10.29)
These axioms are said to be horizontal. Introduce also some new axioms that
show basic properties of non-Archimedean ordered structures. These express a
connection between formulas of various length.
1. Non-Archimedean multiple-validity. It is well known that there ex-
ist infinitesimals that are less than any positive number of [0, 1]. This
property can be expressed by means of the following logical axiom:
(¬(ψ1 ↔ ψ∞)&¬(ϕ1 ↔ ⊥∞))→ (ψ∞ → ϕ1), (10.30)
where ψ1 = ψ1, i.e. it is the first member of an infinite tuple ψ
∞.
2. p-adic multiple-validity. There is a well known theorem according to
that every equivalence class a for which |a|p ≤ 1 (this means that a is a
p-adic integer) has exactly one representative Cauchy sequence {ai}i∈ω
for which:
(a) 0 ≤ ai < pi for i = 1, 2, 3, . . .;
(b) ai ≡ ai+1 mod pi for i = 1, 2, 3, . . .
This property can be expressed by means of the following logical axioms:
((pi+1 − 1⊖ pi − 1)→L ψ
i+1)→L
(ψi+1 ↔ (p− 1⊕ · · · ⊕ p− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi
⊕ψi), (10.31)
(ψi+1 ↔ (
pi︷ ︸︸ ︷
k ⊕ · · · ⊕ k)⊕ ψi)→L
((((. . . (pi+1 − 1⊖ pi − 1)⊖ . . . )⊖ pi − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0<p−k≤p
⊖¬Lk)→L ψ
i+1), (10.32)
(ψi+1 ↔ (
pi︷ ︸︸ ︷
k ⊕ · · · ⊕ k)⊕ ψi)→L
(ψi+1 →L (((. . . (pi+1 − 1⊖
pi − 1)⊖ . . . )⊖ pi − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0≤(p−1)−k≤p−1
⊖¬Lk)), (10.33)
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(ψi+1 →L pi − 1)→L (ψ
i+1 ↔ ψi), (10.34)
(ψi+1 ↔ ψi) ∨ (ψi+1 ↔ (ψi ⊕ pi · 1)) ∨ . . .
∨(ψi+1 ↔ (ψi ⊕ pi · p− 1)), (10.35)
where p− 1 is a tautology at the first-order level and pi − 1 (respectively
pi+1 − 1) a tautology for formulas of i-th length (respectively of (i+1)-th
length); ψ1 = ψ1, i.e. it is the first member of an infinite tuple ψ
∞; ¬Lk is
a first-order formula that has the truth value ((p− 1)−k) ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}
for any its interpretations and k is a first-order formula that has the truth
value k ∈ {0, . . . , p−1} for any its interpretations; 1 is a first-order formula
that has the truth value 1 for any its interpretations, etc. The denoting
pi · k means k ⊕ · · · ⊕ k︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi
.
Axioms (10.30) – (10.35) are said to be vertical.
The deduction rules of BL∞ is modus ponens: from ψ, ψ → ϕ infer ϕ.
The notions of proof, derivability ⊢, theorem, and theory overBL∞ is defined
as usual.
Theorem 5 (Soundness and Completeness) Let Φ be a formula of L′, T
an L′-theory. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
• T ⊢ Φ;
• valiI(Φ) = 〈1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
〉 (resp. val∞I (Φ) =
∗1) for each L∗V -model M of T ;
Proof. This follows from theorem 4 and semantic rules of BL∞. ✷
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Chapter 11
Neutrosophic sets
11.1 Vague sets
Let U be the universe of discourse, U = {u1, u2, . . . , un}, with a generic element
of U denoted by ui. A vague set A in U is characterized by a truth-membership
function tA and a false-membership function fA,
tA : U → [0, 1],
fA : U → [0, 1],
where tA(ui) is a lower bound on the grade of membership of ui derived from
the evidence for ui, fA(ui) is a lower bound on the negation of ui derived from
the evidence against ui, and tA(ui) + fA(ui) 6 1. The grade of membership
of ui in the vague set A is bounded to a subinterval [tA(ui), 1 − fA(ui)] of
[0, 1]. The vague value [tA(ui), 1 − fA(ui)] indicates that the exact grade of
membership µA(ui) of ui may be unknown. But it is bounded by tA(ui) 6
µA(ui) 6 1−fA(ui), where tA(ui)+fA(ui) 6 1. When the universe of discourse
U is continuous, a vague set A can be written as
A =
∫
U
[tA(ui), 1− fA(ui)]/ui, ui ∈ U.
When U is discrete, then
A =
n∑
i=1
[tA(ui), 1− fA(ui)]/ui, ui ∈ U.
Logical operations in vague set theory are defined as follows:
Let x and y be two vague values, x = [tx, 1 − fx], y = [ty, 1 − fy], where
tx ∈ [0, 1], fx ∈ [0, 1], ty ∈ [0, 1], fy ∈ [0, 1], tx + fx 6 1 and ty + fy 6 1. Then
¬Lx = [1− tx, fx],
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x ∧ y = [min(tx, ty),min(1− fx, 1− fy)],
x ∨ y = [max(tx, ty),max(1− fx, 1− fy)].
11.2 Neutrosophic set operations
Definition 31 Let U be the universe of discourse, U = {u1, u2, . . . , un}. A
hyper-valued neutrosophic set A in U is characterized by a truth-membership
function tA, an indeterminacy-membership function iA, and a false-membership
function fA
tA ∋ f : U →
∗[0, 1],
iA ∋ f : U →
∗[0, 1],
fA ∋ f : U →
∗[0, 1],
where tA is the degree of truth-membership function, iA is the degree of indeter-
minacy-membership function, and fA is the degree of falsity-membership func-
tion. There is no restriction on the sum of tA, iA, and fA, i.e.
∗0 6 max tA(ui) + max iA(ui) + max fA(ui) 6
∗3.
Definition 32 Let U be the universe of discourse, U = {u1, u2, . . . , un}. A
p-adic valued neutrosophic set A in U is characterized by a truth-membership
function tA, an indeterminacy-membership function iA, and a false-membership
function fA
tA ∋ f : U → Zp,
iA ∋ f : U → Zp,
fA ∋ f : U → Zp,
where tA is the degree of truth-membership function, iA is the degree of indeter-
minacy-membership function, and fA is the degree of falsity-membership func-
tion. There is no restriction on the sum of tA, iA, and fA, i.e.
0 6 max tA(ui) + max iA(ui) + max fA(ui) 6 Nmax +Nmax +Nmax = −3.
Also, a neutrosophic set A is understood as a triple 〈tA, iA, fA〉 and it can
be regarded as consisting of hyper-valued or p-adic valued degrees.
As we see, in neutrosophic sets, indeterminacy is quantified explicitly and
truth-membership, indeterminacy-membership and falsity-membership are in-
dependent. This assumption is very important in many applications such as
information fusion in which we try to combine the data from different sen-
sors. Neutrosophic sets are proposed for the first time in the framework of
neutrosophy that was introduced by Smarandache in 1980: “It is a branch of
philosophy which studies the origin, nature and scope of neutralities, as well as
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their interactions with different ideational spectra” [132].
Neutrosophic set is a powerful general formal framework which generalizes
the concept of the fuzzy set [153], interval valued fuzzy set [145], intuitionistic
fuzzy set [3], and interval valued intuitionistic fuzzy set [4].
Suppose that tA, iA, fA are subintervals of
∗[0, 1]. Then a neutrosophic set
A is called interval one.
When the universe of discourse U is continuous, an interval neutrosophic set
A can be written as
A =
∫
U
〈tA(ui), iA(ui), fA(ui)〉/ui, ui ∈ U.
When U is discrete, then
A =
n∑
i=1
〈tA(ui), iA(ui), fA(ui)〉/ui, ui ∈ U.
The interval neutrosophic set can represent uncertain, imprecise, incomplete
and inconsistent information which exist in real world. It can be readily seen
that the interval neutrosophic set generalizes the following sets:
• the classical set, iA = ∅, min tA = max tA = 0 or 1, min fA = max fA = 0
or 1 and max tA +max fA = 1.
• the fuzzy set, iA = ∅, min tA = max tA ∈ [0, 1], min fA = max fA ∈ [0, 1]
and max tA +max fA = 1.
• the interval valued fuzzy set, iA = ∅, min tA, max tA, min fA, max fA ∈
[0, 1], max tA +min fA = 1 and min tA +max fA = 1.
• the intuitionistic fuzzy set, iA = ∅, min tA = max tA ∈ [0, 1], min fA =
max fA ∈ [0, 1] and max tA +max fA 6 1.
• the interval valued intuitionistic fuzzy set, iA = ∅, min tA, max tA, min fA,
max fA ∈ [0, 1], max tA +min fA 6 1.
• the paraconsistent set, iA = ∅, min tA = max tA ∈ [0, 1], min fA =
max fA ∈ [0, 1] and max tA +max fA > 1.
• the interval valued paraconsistent set, iA = ∅, min tA, max tA, min fA,
max fA ∈ [0, 1], max tA +min fA > 1.
Let S1 and S2 be two real standard or non-standard subsets of
∗[0, 1], then
S1+S2 = {x : x = s1+s2, s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2}, ∗a+S2 = {x : x = ∗a+s2, s2 ∈
S2}, S1 − S2 = {x : x = s1 − s2, s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2}, S1 · S2 = {x : x =
s1 · s2, s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2}, max(S1, S2) = {x : x = max(s1, s2), s1 ∈ S1 and
s2 ∈ S2}, min(S1, S2) = {x : x = min(s1, s2), s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2}.
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1. The complement of a neutrosophic set A is defined as follows
• the  Lukasiewicz complement:
¬LA = 〈∗1− tA, ∗1− iA, ∗1− fA〉, tA, iA, fA ⊆ (∗[0, 1])U ,
¬LA = 〈Nmax − tA, Nmax − iA, Nmax − fA〉, tA, iA, fA ⊆ (Zp)U ,
• the Go¨del complement:
¬GA = 〈¬GtA,¬GiA,¬GfA〉, tA, iA, fA ⊆ (∗[0, 1])U ,
¬GA = 〈¬GtA,¬GiA,¬GfA〉, tA, iA, fA ⊆ (Zp)U ,
where ¬GtA = {¬Gx : x ∈ tA}, ¬GiA = {¬Gx : x ∈ iA}, ¬GfA =
{¬Gx : x ∈ fA},
• the Product complement:
¬ΠA = 〈¬ΠtA,¬ΠiA,¬ΠfA〉, tA, iA, fA ⊆ (∗[0, 1])U ,
¬ΠA = 〈¬ΠtA,¬ΠiA,¬ΠfA〉, tA, iA, fA ⊆ (Zp)U ,
where ¬ΠtA = {¬Πx : x ∈ tA}, ¬ΠiA = {¬Πx : x ∈ iA}, ¬ΠfA =
{¬Πx : x ∈ fA}.
2. The implication of two neutrosophic sets A and B is defined as
follows
• the  Lukasiewicz implication:
A →L B = 〈
∗1 − max(tA, tB) + tB,
∗1 − max(iA, iB) + iB,
∗1 −
max(fA, fB) + fB〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB, fB ⊆ (∗[0, 1])U ,
A→L B = 〈Nmax−max(tA, tB)+tB, Nmax−max(iA, iB)+iB, Nmax−
max(fA, fB) + fB〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB, fB ⊆ (Zp)U ,
• the Go¨del implication:
A →G B = 〈tA →G tB , iA →G iB, fA →G fB〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB,
fB ⊆ (∗[0, 1])U ,
A →G B = 〈tA →G tB , iA →G iB, fA →G fB〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB,
fB ⊆ (Zp)U ,
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where tA →G tB = {x : x = s1 →G s2, s1 ∈ tA and s2 ∈ tB},
iA →G iB = {x : x = s1 →G s2, s1 ∈ iA and s2 ∈ iB}, fA →G fB =
{x : x = s1 →G s2, s1 ∈ fA and s2 ∈ fB},
• the Product implication:
A→Π B = 〈tA →Π tB, iA →Π iB, fA →Π fB〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB, fB ⊆
(∗[0, 1])U ,
A→Π B = 〈tA →Π tB, iA →Π iB, fA →Π fB〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB, fB ⊆
(Zp)
U ,
where tA →Π tB = {x : x = s1 →Π s2, s1 ∈ tA and s2 ∈ tB},
iA →Π iB = {x : x = s1 →Π s2, s1 ∈ iA and s2 ∈ iB}, fA →Π fB =
{x : x = s1 →Π s2, s1 ∈ fA and s2 ∈ fB},
3. The intersection of two neutrosophic sets A and B is defined as
follows
• the  Lukasiewicz intersection:
A&LB = 〈max(tA, ∗1 − tB) + tB − ∗1, max(iA, ∗1 − iB) + iB − ∗1,
max(fA,
∗1− fB) + fB − ∗1〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB, fB ⊆ (∗[0, 1])U ,
A&LB = 〈max(tA, Nmax − tB) + tB −Nmax,max(iA, Nmax − iB) +
iB −Nmax,max(fA, Nmax − fB) + fB −Nmax〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB,
fB ⊆ (Zp)U ,
• the Go¨del intersection:
A&GB = 〈min(tA, tB),min(iA, iB),min(fA, fB)〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB,
fB ⊆ (
∗[0, 1])U ,
A&GB = 〈min(tA, tB),min(iA, iB),min(fA, fB)〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB,
fB ⊆ (Zp)U ,
• the Product intersection:
A&ΠB = 〈tA · tB, iA · iB, fA · fB〉, tA, iA, fA, tB, iB, fB ⊆ (∗[0, 1])U ,
A&ΠB = 〈tA · tB, iA · iB, fA · fB〉, tA, iA, fA, tB , iB, fB ⊆ (Zp)U ,
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Thus, we can extend the logical operations of fuzzy logic to the case of
neutrosophic sets.
Chapter 12
Interval neutrosophic logic
12.1 Interval neutrosophic matrix logic
Interval neutrosophic logic proposed in [132], [133], [151] generalizes the interval
valued fuzzy logic, the non-Archimedean valued fuzzy logic, and paraconsistent
logics. In the interval neutrosophic logic, we consider not only truth-degree and
falsity-degree, but also indeterminacy-degree which can reliably capture more
information under uncertainty.
Now consider hyper-valued interval neutrosophic matrix logic INL defined
as the ordered system 〈(∗[0, 1])3, ¬INL, →INL, ∨INL, ∧INL, ∃˜INL, ∀˜INL, {〈∗1,
∗0, ∗0〉}〉 where
1. for all 〈t, i, f〉 ∈ (∗[0, 1])3, ¬INL〈t, i, f〉 = 〈f, 1− i, t〉,
2. for all 〈t1, i1, f1〉, 〈t2, i2, f2〉 ∈ (
∗[0, 1])3, 〈t1, i1, f1〉 →INL 〈t2, i2, f2〉 =
〈min(∗1, ∗1− t1 + t2),max(∗0, i2 − i1),max(∗0, f2 − f1)〉,
3. for all 〈t1, i1, f1〉, 〈t2, i2, f2〉 ∈ (∗[0, 1])3, 〈t1, i1, f1〉 ∧INL 〈t2, i2, f2〉 =
〈min(t1, t2),max(i1, i2),max(f1, f2)〉,
4. for all 〈t1, i1, f1〉, 〈t2, i2, f2〉 ∈ (∗[0, 1])3, 〈t1, i1, f1〉 ∨INL 〈t2, i2, f2〉 =
〈max(t1, t2),min(i1, i2),min(f1, f2)〉,
5. for a subset 〈M1, M2, M3〉 ⊆ (∗[0, 1])3, ∃˜(〈M1, M2, M3〉) = 〈max(M1),
min(M2),min(M3)〉,
6. for a subset 〈M1, M2, M3〉 ⊆ (
∗[0, 1])3, ∀˜(〈M1, M2, M3〉) = 〈min(M1),
max(M2),max(M3)〉,
7. {〈∗1, ∗0, ∗0〉} is the set of designated truth values.
Now consider p-adic valued interval neutrosophic matrix logic INL defined
as the ordered system 〈(Zp)3, ¬INL, →INL, ∨INL, ∧INL, ∃˜INL, ∀˜INL, {〈Nmax,
0, 0〉}〉 where
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1. for all 〈t, i, f〉 ∈ (Zp)3, ¬INL〈t, i, f〉 = 〈f, 1− i, t〉,
2. for all 〈t1, i1, f1〉, 〈t2, i2, f2〉 ∈ (Zp)3, 〈t1, i1, f1〉 →INL 〈t2, i2, f2〉 =
〈Nmax −max(t1, t2) + t2, max(0, i2 − i1),max(0, f2 − f1)〉,
3. for all 〈t1, i1, f1〉, 〈t2, i2, f2〉 ∈ (Zp)3, 〈t1, i1, f1〉 ∧INL 〈t2, i2, f2〉 =
〈min(t1, t2),max(i1, i2),max(f1, f2)〉,
4. for all 〈t1, i1, f1〉, 〈t2, i2, f2〉 ∈ (Zp)3, 〈t1, i1, f1〉 ∨INL 〈t2, i2, f2〉 =
〈max(t1, t2),min(i1, i2),min(f1, f2)〉,
5. for a subset 〈M1, M2, M3〉 ⊆ (Zp)3, ∃˜(〈M1, M2, M3〉) = 〈max(M1),
min(M2),min(M3)〉,
6. for a subset 〈M1, M2, M3〉 ⊆ (Zp)3, ∀˜(〈M1, M2, M3〉) = 〈min(M1),
max(M2),max(M3)〉,
7. {〈Nmax, 0, 0〉} is the set of designated truth values.
As we see, interval neutrosophic matrix logic INL is an extension of the
non-Archimedean valued  Lukasiewicz matrix logic.
12.2 Hilbert’s type calculus for interval neutro-
sophic propositional logic
Interval neutrosophic calculus denoted by INL is built in the framework of the
language L′ considered in section 10.4, but its semantics is different.
An interpretation is defined in the standard way. Extend the valuation of
L′ to the valuation for interval neutrosophic calculus as follows.
Definition 33 Given an interpretation I = 〈M, s〉 and a valuation val∞I of L
′,
we define the hyper-valued interval neutrosophic valuation val∞,INLI (·) to be a
mapping from formulas of the form ϕ∞ of L′ to interval neutrosophic matrix
logic INL as follows:
val∞,INLI (ϕ
∞) = 〈val∞I (ϕ
∞) = t(ϕ∞), i(ϕ∞), f(ϕ∞)〉 ∈ (∗[0, 1])3.
Definition 34 Given an interpretation I = 〈M, s〉 and a valuation val∞I of L
′,
we define the p-adic valued interval neutrosophic valuation val∞,INLI (·) to be a
mapping from formulas of the form ϕ∞ of L′ to interval neutrosophic matrix
logic INL as follows:
val∞,INLI (ϕ
∞) = 〈val∞I (ϕ
∞) = t(ϕ∞), i(ϕ∞), f(ϕ∞)〉 ∈ (Zp)
3.
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We say that an INL-structure M is a model of an INL-theory T iff
val∞,INLI (ϕ
∞) = 〈∗1, ∗0, ∗0〉
on M for each ϕ∞ ∈ T .
Proposition 17 In the matrix logic INL, modus ponens is preserved, i.e. if ϕ∞
and ϕ∞ →INL ψ∞ are INL-tautologies, then ψ∞ is also an INL-tautology.
Proof. Consider the hyper-valued case. Since ϕ∞ and ϕ∞ →INL ψ∞ are INL-
tautologies, then
val∞,INLI (ϕ) = val
∞,INL
I (ϕ
∞ →INL ψ
∞) = 〈∗1, ∗0, ∗0〉,
that is val∞,INLI (ϕ
∞) = 〈∗1, ∗0, ∗0〉, val∞,INLI (ϕ
∞ →INL ψ∞) = 〈min(∗1, ∗1 −
t(ϕ∞) + t(ψ)) = ∗1,max(∗0, i(ψ∞) − i(ϕ∞)) = ∗0,max(∗0, f(ψ∞) − f(ϕ∞)) =
∗0〉. Hence, t(ψ∞) = ∗1, i(ψ∞) = f(ψ∞) = ∗0. So ψ∞ is an INL-tautology. ✷
The following axiom schemata for INL were regarded in [151].
ψ∞ →INL (ϕ
∞ →INL ψ
∞), (12.1)
(ψ∞ ∧INL ϕ
∞)→INL ϕ
∞, (12.2)
ψ∞ →INL (ψ
∞ ∨INL ϕ
∞), (12.3)
ψ∞ →INL (ϕ
∞ →INL (ψ
∞ ∧INL ϕ
∞)), (12.4)
(ψ∞ →INL χ
∞)→INL ((ϕ
∞ →INL χ
∞)→INL (12.5)
((ψ∞ ∨INL ϕ
∞)→INL χ
∞)),
((ψ∞ ∨INL ϕ
∞)→INL χ
∞)↔INL (12.6)
((ψ∞ →INL χ
∞) ∧INL (ϕ
∞ →INL χ
∞)),
(ψ∞ →INL ϕ
∞)↔INL (¬INLϕ
∞ →INL ¬INLψ
∞), (12.7)
(ψ∞ →INL ϕ
∞) ∧INL (ϕ
∞ →INL χ
∞)→INL (ψ
∞ →INL χ
∞), (12.8)
(ψ∞ →INL ϕ
∞)↔INL (12.9)
(ψ∞ ↔INL (ψ
∞ ∧INL ϕ
∞))↔INL
(ϕ∞ →INL (ψ
∞ ∨INL ϕ
∞)).
The only inference rule of INL is modus ponens.
We can take also the non-Archimedean case of axiom schemata (4.1) –
(4.4) for the axiomatization of INL, because INL is a generalization of non-
Archimedean valued  Lukasiewicz’s logic (see the previous section). This
means that we can also set INL as generalization of non-Archimedean valued
Go¨del’s, Product or Post’s logics.
102
Chapter 13
Conclusion
The informal sense of Archimedes’ axiom is that anything can be measured
by a ruler. The negation of this axiom allows to postulate infinitesimals and
infinitely large integers and, as a result, to consider non-wellfounded and neu-
trality phenomena. In this book we examine the non-Archimedean fuzziness, i.e.
fuzziness that runs over the non-Archimedean number systems. We show that
this fuzziness is constructed in the framework of the t-norm based approach. We
consider two cases of the non-Archimedean fuzziness: one with many-validity in
the interval [0, 1] of hypernumbers and one with many-validity in the ring Zp of
p-adic integers. This fuzziness has a lot of practical applications, e.g. it can be
used in non-Kolmogorovian approaches to probability theory.
Non-Archimedean logic is constructed on the base of infinite DSm models.
Its instances are the following multi-valued logics:
• hyperrational valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Product logics,
• hyperreal valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Product logics,
• p-adic valued  Lukasiewicz’s, Go¨del’s, and Post’s logics.
These systems can be used in probabilistic and fuzzy reasoning.
Hyper-valued (resp. p-adic valued) interval neutrosophic logic INL by which
we can describe neutrality phenomena is an extension of non-Archimedean val-
ued fuzzy logic that is obtained by adding a truth triple 〈t, i, f〉 ∈ (∗[0, 1])3
(resp. 〈t, i, f〉 ∈ (Zp)3) instead of one truth value t ∈ ∗[0, 1] (resp. t ∈ Zp) to the
formula valuation, where t is a truth-degree, i is an indeterminacy-degree, and
f is a falsity-degree.
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